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A CONCEPT FOR REDUCING OCEANIC SEPARATION
MINIMA THROUGH THE USE OF A
TCAS-DERIVED CDTI
W. D. Love, A. L. McFarland, and J. S. Ludwlck
The MITRE Corporation
SECTION 1
SUMMARY
This report presents and evaluates a concept for using a cockpit
display of traffic information (CDTI) to potentially help support
reductions in the air traffic separation minima for oceanic track
systems. Such reductions could provide significant savings in
flight costs. The CDTI would be derived from a modified version of
the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II).
Under the oceanic CDTI concept, primary reliance for the safe
separation of aircraft would continue to be placed on planned
separation using the oceanic track system. The CDTI system would
only be used to detect and resolve conflicts where the planned
separation minima had been violated. Under this concept, all pilots
would monitor a single Very High Frequency (VHF) voice channel.
Aircraft call signs would be encoded in TCAS air-to-air data
exchanges to permit voice communication to be established between
conflicting flights. The TCAS II surveillance range and traffic
alert boundaries would be enlarged to provide at least two minutes
of warning prior to the closest approach of two aircraft; this
should provide sufficient time for the pilots to negotiate a
resolution strategy over the air-to-air voice channel and perform
routine resolution maneuvers.
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A theoretical evaluation of the feasibility of the oceanic CDTI
concept was performed from a number of standpoints. The necessary
modifications to TCAS II to support this concept were determined; it
was concluded that these modifications were feasible, but possibly
at significant extra cost. Pilot procedures were developed for
dealing with alert situations. The ability of the system to
maintain or increase safety levels was examined. Maximum alert
rates from the pilot's viewpoint were estimated for various sets of
reduced separation minima in a parallel track system. A number of
implementation issues were investigated, including contention for
the voice channel and oceanic multipath effects. It was concluded
from these analyses that at least 50% reductions in the current
separation minima for both the lateral and longitudinal dimensions
should be possible with the oceanic CDTI system. The system also
shows promise for supporting reductions in vertical separation on
the basis of the analyses conducted in this study. Additional
experimental evaluations are needed to validate this possibility.
Supplementary investigations included the development of possible
transltlon strategies for the oceanic CDTI system. A number of
variations and extensions of the concept were also considered.
Finally, recommendations were made for further data collection
efforts and cockpit simulation experiments which could be conducted
to confirm the feasibility of the oceanic CDTI concept.
SECTION 2
INTRODUCTION
For the past few years there has been a joint program between
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to investigate how a
pilot might use a display in the cockpit that shows the positions of
nearby aircraft in relation to his own aircraft. This presentation
of traffic to the pilot is called Cockpit Display of Traffic
Information (CDTI). Recently, there has been a review of the CDTI
program, in which several potentially needed improvements in air
traffic operations were considered. Those improvements that might
be supported through the use of CDTI were identified. One of these
potentially needed improvements is for a reduction in the separation
minima in oceanic areas so that aircraft can more often fly routes
and altitudes that are optimal from a fuel consumption point of view.
Purpose
The purpose of this study was to develop and analyze a concept
for using CDTI information, as derived from an airborne collision
avoidance system, to support reductions in separation minima in
oceanic areas. A primary goal of the study was to determine what
changes could be made to the current Traffic Alert and Collision
Avoidance System II (TCAS II) to permit it to provide the necessary
information for this purpose. Another important goal was to provide
an initial assessment of the feasibility of this oceanic CDTI
concept. It should be noted that the methods for transoceanic
control proposed in this document were developed solely to provide a
framework within which further research studies could be conducted
by NASA.
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The benefitsof reducingair trafficseparationminima are
significantand have been well documented. For instance,SRI
International,under contractto the FAA, recentlyinvestigatedthe
potentialbenefitsof reducedseparationin the OceanicArea System
ImprovementStudy (OASIS). The final report concludedthat the
potentialsavings in flight costs over a twentyyear period might
run into the hundredsof millionsof dollarsfor the North Atlantic
alone (Referencei). By capitalizingon the currentstage of
developmentof TCAS, these benefitsmight be realizedin the
relativelynear future.
Objectives and Scope
The specific objectives of this study were as follows:
(i) Identify any changes to the current TCAS II design which
would be necessary to implement the oceanic CDTI concept.
(2) Develop possible pilot procedures for dealing with alert
situations.
(3) Identify candidate schemes for reducing separation minima
that might be supported by the oceanic CDTI concept.
(4) Estimate the maximum alert rates for the proposed concept
for each candidate scheme identified.
(5) Estimate the expected benefits of the proposed system.
(6) Investigate implementation issues surrounding the concept.
(7) Devise possible strategies for transitioning to the
proposed system.
(8) Consider possible variations to the proposed system.
(9) Make recommendations for additional in-depth studies and
experiments which might be used to validate the oceanic
CDTI concept.
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These objectives were met through engineering analysis and a review
of current research literature; no cockpit simulations or extensive
computer analyses were undertaken.
In general, this study was based upon the assumption of a
hlgh-altitude oceanic track system with parallel tracks. Although
the oceanic CDTI concept might also provide significant benefits in
non-track oceanic areas, it would be more difficult to develop
operational procedures and to assess the value of the system for
such an environment. Traffic data and basellneseparatlon minima
for this study were based upon current oceanic track systems_
particularly the North Atlantic track system. A ground rule for
this study was that any proposed changes to TCAS must not affect its
normal operation over land areas.
Approach
To achieve the objectives of this study_ the following approach
was taken. First, a preliminary concept for using CDTI, as derived
from a modified TCAS unit, was developed. This concept included a
provision for the pilots of two aircraft to verbally coordinate, via
VHF radio, a resolution of any situation causing an alert. The
operations of current oceanic track systems were then revlewed_ and
several candidate approaches to reducing the separation minima were
proposed. These were analyzed briefly for feasibility. Several
were eliminated from further consideration at this stage.
The preliminary concept was then refined. The specific
modifications that would be required of the TCAS II units (as
currently defined) to support the oceanic CDTI concept were
identified. Both equipment and logic modifications were studied.
Then, possible pilot procedures for dealing with the alerts
generated by the CDTI system, and for negotiating with other pilots,
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were developed. These procedures included actions that would be
appropriate for each of the candidate schemes for reducing
separation minima.
Next, the operation of the CDTI system with each of the
candidate schemes was studied in depth from a number of viewpoints.
Maximum alert rates were estimated for each of the candidate
approaches, and the effect of the alerts on pilot workload was
assessed. The benefits of implementing each of the candidate
schemes for reducing separation minima were then evaluated. Such
benefits as reduced operating costs for users of the system,
increased capacity of the track system, and improved safety of
oceanic flight were considered. Transition strategies for
converting from the current separation minima to those of the
proposed new schemes were assessed for each of the candidates.
Finally, with the preceding information in hand, a comparative
evaluation of the overall merit of each candidate scheme was
prepared.
Additional study was performed to identify and investigate
implementation issues surrounding the oceanic CDTI concept. These
included contention for the voice channel, oceanic multipath
effects, and TCAS interference levels. Possible variations of the
basic concept were then addressed briefly. These included
variations to deal with unequipped aircraft, to handle aircraft
crossing the tracks, and to permit cruise climb.
From the results of the above activities, recommendations were
made for data collection efforts and simulation studies that could
be used to confirm the feasibility of the concept proposed in this
document.
MeasurementUnits
Calculation and measurement values used in this report are
generally expressed in both SI units and in customary units (in
parentheses following the SI units). In all cases, the customary
units were used for the original measurements and calculations.
SECTION 3
BACKGROUND
In this section, background information is provided on the
current TCAS II design and on the current operation of oceanic track
systems.
Current TCAS II Design
TCAS II is an airborne system that makes use of air-to-air
beacon transmissions for the purpose of aircraft separation
assurance. The system is capable of detecting and tracking aircraft
that are equipped with secondary surveillance radar (SSR)
transponders. TCAS II can provide both traffic advisories and
resolution advisories against intruders that are so equipped. The
avionics for each TCAS II unit includes a Mode S transponder with
data link capability. Whenever two TCAS-equipped aircraft come into
conflict, their resolution actions are automatically coordinated via
the Mode S data link.
Two versions of TCAS II are currently under development:
Minimum TCAS II and Enhanced TCAS II. Minimum TCAS II is described
in detail in the TCAS II Minimum Operational Performance
Specification (MOPS) recently prepared by Special Committee 147 of
the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA). This
document is listed as Reference 2. Minimum TCAS II is currently in
the final stages of development and testing. Because of the limited
accuracy of its bearing data, Minimum TCAS II can provide resolution
advisories in the vertical dimension only (e.g., "climb" and
"descend"). Enhanced TCAS II is a proposed version of TCAS II which
would be capable of deriving more accurate bearing information,
enabling it to provide resolution advisories in the horizontal
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dimension (e.g. "turn left" and "turn right"), in addition to the
vertical.
In general, TCAS II will generate an advisory for each nearby
aircraft whose projected separation is within certain predefined
bounds. These alert boundaries may vary according to local traffic
and airspace conditions. However, for high-altitude enroute
airspace, the alert boundaries for Minimum TCAS II are defined
essentially as follows: A resolution advisory is issued if an
intruder is projected to come closer than 1.9 km (i.0 n. mi.) in
range within 30 seconds and is projected to be within 290 m (950 ft)
of own aircraft's altitude at the time of horizontal closest
approach. Traffic advisories are of two types: threat advisories
and proximity advisories. A threat advisory is issued if an
intruder is projected to come closer than 2.2 km (1.2 n. mi.) in
range within 45 seconds and is currently within 370 m (1200 ft) of
own aircraft's altitude (or is projected to cross own aircraft's
altitudewithin 45 seconds). A proximity advisory is issued if the
intruder is currently within 7.4 km (4.0 n. mi.) of own aircraft in
range and within 370 m (1200 ft) of own aircraft vertically, but
does not meet the criteria for a threat advisory.
Because of the limited accuracy of its bearing data, the
detection of large horizontal miss distances is difficult for the
Minimum TCAS II system. (Horizontal miss distance is the range of a
threat aircraft at the point of its horizontal closest approach.)
Even though filtering on horizontal miss distance could eliminate
some unnecessary alerts, the current logic for Minimum TCAS II does
not specifically include a horizontal miss distance filter.
However, some testing of such a filter has been performed as part of
the TCAS program; this filter is referred to as "tau-dot logic."
Although this filter is not included in the current TCAS design, it
is mentioned here because of its potential value for the oceanic
CDTI system. 9
The alert criteria for Enhanced TCAS II are expected to be
basically the same as those used by Minimum TCAS II. However, more
accurate bearing data should allow Enhanced TCAS II to use a true
projection of horizontal miss distance to eliminate even more
unnecessary alerts.
The oceanic CDTI concept described in this document is based
upon a modified version of Minimum TCAS II (as specified in the TCAS
II MOPS). The additional capabilities of Enhanced TCAS If, though
potentially useful in this application, are not considered essential
and have been ignored in the analyses presented here.
Current Operation of Oceanic Track Systems
The oceanic track systems _n use today have a number of features
in common. They are typically composed of parallel tracks, with a
number of flight levels being used on each track. The systems
operate at high altitudes (above 8800 m, or 29 000 ft), and flight
levels are generally separated by 610 m (2000 ft). Aircraft
separation for a track system is governed by an official separation
standard, which specifies the minimum separation of tracks and
flight levels, as well as the minimum longitudinal spacing between
consecutive aircraft on the same track and flight level. The
minimum longitudinal spacing is typically adjusted to account for
any differences in Mach number between successive aircraft on the
same track.
Control procedures for different track systems also have a
number of similarities. Each aircraft must receive a clearance from
the appropriate oceanic control center before entering the system.
Among other things, the clearance specifies the aircraft's assigned
track, flight level, and time of entry into the system. Except in
an emergency, a pilot desiring to change tracks, flight levels, or
i0
filed Mach number must first negotiate a new clearance with oceanic
control. Radar surveillance is typically not available over most of
an oceanic track system. Therefore, oceanic separation minima are
comparatively large, and each pilot is required to periodically
report his position to the oceanic control center. Each track
system has its own reporting requirements. For instance, in
East-West systems, each aircraft is generally required to report its
position every ten degrees of longitude.
In oceanic track systems, High Frequency (HF) radio is used for
communication between pilots and oceanic control centers. As a
rule, pilots do not talk directly to controllers. Instead, messages
must be relayed through a communications center, which is generally
not co-located with the oceanic contol center. A pilot files a
position report or requests a change in flight plan by talking to
the communications center over HF radio. An operator then sends
this message to the oceanic control center (typically by teletype).
The reply from oceanic control follows a reverse process. An
exchange of messages between a pilot and controllers can take ten
minutes or more. Thus, a request for a change in clearance must be
planned well in advance, and quick response from controllers in
helping to resolve an urgent problem is not possible. VHF radio,
being limited to line-of-sight distances, is not generally used for
oceanic control purposes.
The two largest oceanic track systems, in terms of daily
operations, are the North Atlantic (NAT) track system and the
Central East Pacific (CEP) track system. Both are East-West
systems. The NAT track system, operating generally between
Newfoundland and Ireland, is the larger, in terms of both traffic
and length. The system is roughly 3700 km (2000 n. mi.) in length.
The CEP track system, operating generally between Hawaii and
southern California, is somewhat shorter than the NAT track system.
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Some of the differences between the NAT and CEP track systems are
worth mentioning.
The NAT track system is completely rebuilt twice each day to
take best advantage of the existing meteorological conditions,
prevailing winds, and traffic demand. Traffic is predominantly one
way. Traffic moving opposite to the prevailing direction typically
occupies one or two tracks separate from the prevailing flow.
Opposite-direction traffic is seldom separated vertically from the
prevailing traffic on the same track. Figure l shows the structure
of a predominantly westbound NAT track system on a typical day.
The safety of current separation standards in the NAT track
system is ensured by the enforcement of a Minimum Navigational
Performance Specification (MNPS) for all aircraft using the system
(Reference S). The MNPS requires that each aircraft's lateral
navigational accuracy have a standard deviation of error of no more
than 12 km (6.3 n. mi.). Also, the fraction of time spent more than
56 km (30 n. mi.) off course must be less than 5.3 x 10-4. The
fraction of time spent between 9S km (50 n. mi.) and 130 km (70 n.
mi.) off course must be less than iS x 10-5.
The CEP track system, in contrast to the NAT, uses fixed tracks
which do not change. Unlike the NAT, alternate flight levels are
used for opposite-direction traffic on all tracks in the CEP.
One-direction traffic is not as prevalent in the CEP as in the NAT.
Because of the lack of radar surveillance, as well as the lack
of direct pilot-controller communications, maintaining separation
between aircraft in an oceanic track system depends solely upon
12
(Reprinted hy permission from Reference 3)
Figure 1.-Typical daytime westbound track
system for the North Atlantic.
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aircraft maintaining their assigned tracks, flight levels, and Mach
numbers using their on-board navigation systems and cockpit
instruments. In the NAT, the aircraft are required by the MNPS to
have duplicate navigation systems, but no direct, corroborating
measurements of aircraft separation are made today. This open-loop
approach to ensuring aircraft separation demands the very large
separation minima that are in current use.
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SECTION4
CONCEPTDESCRIPTION
This section summarizes the concept for using CDTI to support
reductions in separation minima in an oceanic track system. The
concept described here is the result of the study reported in this
document. The remainder of this document records the steps taken in
developing this concept, and assesses the feasibility and
limitations of the concept.
In the track systemsused in oceanicareas today, separation
betweenaircraftis achievedby assigningaircraftto specific
tracks,flight levels,and Mach numbersand then by requiringthe
aircraftto adhere closelyto these assignments. Since separation
is based solelyupon onboardnavigationsystemswithout surveillance
data, very large separationminima must be applied. The concept
proposedhere is for the use of TCAS equipmentwhich has been
modifiedto providelong-rangeCDTI capabilityin oceanicareas.
The conceptis designed to permit smallerseparationminima to be
appliedbetweenaircraftwhich are so equipped. With these reduced
separationminima,airlineswould be able to fly flight paths more
nearly approachingthe optimalones, and they would thus be able to
save time and fuel on their transoceanicflights.
The displaygeneratedfrom direct TCAS measurementof separation
permitsrecognitionof the loss of separationcaused by aircraft
driftingfrom their assignedflight paths and providesa means for
ensuringsafe separationwhen this happens. The TCAS system tracks
all targetswithin its surveillancerange and continuouslytests to
see if any of them are convergingto a close approach. If so, the
TCAS unit alerts the pilot with an aural alert; displaysa symbol
and data block for that target on a plan view displaythat indicates
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the target's range, bearing and flight level; and flashes or
otherwise highlights the position symbol of that target. This will
be called a CDTI alert. The TCAS unit also determines if a target
is close enough to be of concern to the pilot, even though it may
not be converging rapidly. If so, it displays the target, but does
not generate an aural alert and does not flash or highlight the
position symbol. This will be called a CDTI proximity advisory.
An important element of this concept is that pilots would
monitor a single, specially designated VHF frequency at all times
when within the oceanic track system. If two aircraft were losing
safe separation, the two pilots would make voice contact, exchange
additional data about their situations, and negotiate a compatible
set of actions to avoid a close approach. When the TCAS unit found
a target converging, it would automatically acquire the Air Traffic
Control (ATC) call sign of that target and display it with the
target's position symbol on the CDTI display. This would permit the
pilot to initiate voice contact with the pilot of the target
aircraft on the designated voice frequency.
The TCAS unit which supports this CDTI concept requires several
modifications to the normal Minimum TCAS II equipment. First, the
effective transmitter power and receiver sensitivity of the TCAS
unit must be raised to increase the surveillance range. This is
required to provide the time necessary for voice coordination. The
exact amount of the required increase in range depends on the way in
which separation minima are reduced, as described later in this
document. In no case would the surveillance range need to be
greater than 74 km (40 n. mi.).
Provisions must also be made for the pilot to enter his call
sign into his Mode S transponder, and the TCAS unit must be able to
make an interrogation to solicit the call sign from another Mode S
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ftransponder. The TCAS unit must have a test capability, in addition
to the self-test feature required of the Minimum TCAS II, that
permits the pilot to receive, while airborne, a graphical or tabular
display of all targets being tracked by his TCAS. The TCAS unit
must have a switch that permits it to be manually switched between
the oceanic mode and the normal mode. In the normal mode the TCAS
unit must behave exactly like a Minimum TCAS II.
The TCAS displaymust be modifiedslightlyto supportthe CDTI
concept. It must have a scale suitablefor displayingtargets--
perhapsas much as 74 km (40 n. mi.) ahead and 37 km (20 n. ml.)
behind own aircraft. It must also be capableof displayingthe ATC
call sign of a targetaircraft.
The TCAS logic must also be modified to supportthe CDTI
concept. The TCAS trafficalert parametersmust be modifiedto give
a CDTI alert approximately120 secondsbefore the closestapproach
of a targetaircraft. This logic should includea horizontalmiss
distancefilter in some form. The TCAS logic must also be modified
to give a CDTI proximityadvisory for a targetat a much greater
range than the normal TCAS proximityadvisory.
When the TCAS unit is switchedto the oceanicmode, it is able
to generateCDTI alerts,CDTI proximityadvisories,or TCAS
resolutionadvisories,if the correspondinglogic criteriaare
satisfied. When the normal mode is selected,only TCAS threat
advisories,proximityadvisories,and resolutionadvisoriesmay be
issued. Note that resolutionadvisoriesmay be issued in either
mode.
The oceanicCDTI conceptstill dependsprimarilyon the
structureprovidedby the oceanictrack systemto keep aircraft
separated. The CDTI system is designedto protectagainsthazards
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caused by deviations from assigned flight paths. It is not intended
to be a primary separation mechanism.
In this concept, reduced separation minima would be applied only
between two aircraft which are CDTl-equlpped. In the oceanic track
system as a whole, this might be achieved by setting aside
designated tracks to be used by CDTl-equipped aircraft only.
Whenever CDTl-equipped and unequipped aircraft operate on adjacent
tracks or flight levels, the present separation minima must be
applied. However, in the rare event that a CDTl-equipped aircraft
encountered an unequipped aircraft, a CDTI alert would be issued
against the intruder to provide additional safety. In this concept
it is proposed that the pilot not make voice contact with an
unequipped aircraft.
A gradual transition strategy for implementing the oceanic CDTI
concept is proposed. This strategy would provide early cost-savlng
benefits for the first aircraft to acquire the CDTI capability.
Initially, only one or two tracks might be reserved for use
exclusively by CDTl-equlpped aircraft. As more aircraft became
equipped, more tracks would be converted to CDTl-only tracks.
If vertical or longitudinal separation standards were reduced, a
single existing track could be converted initially to a CDTI-only
track. On this track, the vertical or longitudinal separations
between CDTl-equipped aircraft would be reduced. But the lateral
separations between these aircraft and aircraft on adjacent tracks
would remain unchanged. If only lateral separations were reduced,
it would be necessary to establish at least two adjacent tracks that
were CDTI-only tracks. The separation between these two would be
reduced, while the separation between either of these and the
adjacent normal track would be unchanged.
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The track(s) to be converted to CDTl-only tracks should be those
that are most heavily used. These are the ones where reduced
separations would have the greatest overall benefit. (Presumably
these tracks are the mlnlmum-fuel tracks for a large number of
flights and are, therefore, popular tracks.) Other than offering
the incentive of receiving the preferred tracks or more nearly
optimal tracks to equipped users, no additional encouragement for
equipage should be required. No regulations mandating equipage are
envisioned. Tracks should be converted to CDTl-only tracks at a
rate to keep pace with the equipage rate of aircraft using the
oceanic track system. The period of time required to recover the
costs of the equipment through fuel savings should be short enough
to make the concept attractive on its own merits.
Pilot procedures for operating the TCAS unit and for responding
to CDTI indications are proposed. First of all, several
pilot-lnltlated tests of the TCAS equipment must be performed on
each flight prior to entering the oceanic track system. These tests
are intended to ensure that the TCAS unit is operating properly
before the aircraft is permitted to enter the oceanic track system
under reduced separatlonmlnlma. Secondly, the pilot would probably
check his CDTI display periodically during his flight, even if he
has not been alerted, because there may be proximity targets
displayed. (Targets satisfying the CDTI proximity advisory criteria
would not be brought to the pilot's attention via an aural alert,
because they would not represent a threat at that time.) Finally,
procedures are proposed for dealing with CDTI alerts. These
generally involve assessing the situation and negotiating a
resolution strategy with the pilot of the threat aircraft over the
alr-to-alr voice channel. Procedures appropriate for specific
geometries are suggested. The proposed pilot procedures are
described in detail in Section 7 and Appendix A of this report.
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The oceanic CDTI concept as described above is promising for the
following reasons:
(1) The need for reduced separation minima in oceanic areas is
real and immediate.
(2) TCAS can support this concept with relatively
straightforward modifications to the currently-defined
system.
(3) If it is assumed that an airline would install the Minimum
TCAS II for midair collision protection, regardless of
whether or not the oceanic CDTI concept were adopted, then
the airline can realize the oceanic cost savings for only
the incremental cost of the TCAS II modifications.
(4) Many of the objections to the use of CDTI in other contexts
are not applicable here. For instance, pilot workload is
not a primary limitation in oceanic areas. Also, there
should be no controversy about the pilot's role and how
responsibility is divided between the air traffic
controller and the pilot.
(5) It would be easy to assign a single VHF frequency and
permit voice contact, since pilots shouldn't need to
monitor any other VHF frequencies (except the emergency
frequency, 121.5 MHz).
(6) Possible limitations of the TCAS surveillance system in
high-density airspace are not a factor in the low-density
oceanic environment.
(7) The TCAS surveillance system is an independent monitor that
can provide protection against navigation errors or
blunders, whatever the cause. Today there is no
independent check of navigation, and the separation minima
have been established to protect against rare instances of
very large navigation errors.
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(8) Uncertainties about the effects of undetected large
altimetry errors are largely eliminated in this concept,
because only CDTl-equipped aircraft are permitted on tracks
which involve reduced separation minima. The TCAS MOPS
requires that an aircraft which carries TCAS must have an
altimetry system meeting more stringent requirements than
those that are currently imposed for flight in U.S.
airspace.
(9) Because reduced separation standards would be applied only
when all aircraft are equipped_ most encounters would
involve two CDTl-equipped aircraft. This provides a
natural redundancy which would mean a high degree of
protection from isolated equipment failures and errors in
human judgment.
While the CDTI concept offers these advantages, it has some
limitations and some areas of uncertainty at the present stage of
investigation. The most significant of these are:
(I) What maximum surveillance range is actually required to
support this concept? Can this range be achieved
reasonably in the TCAS unit?
(2) What will be the actual incremental cost in production
equipment to provide the modifications required to support
the concept? Can this cost be recovered via fuel and other
cost savings in a reasonable period of time?
(3) Is the bearing accuracy attainable with the Minimum TCAS II
equipment adequate to support pilot use of horizontal
resolution maneuvers?
(4) Can the production TCAS system be built with sufficient
reliability and fault monitoring capabilities to support
this concept?
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(5) Can altimetry system accuracies sufficient to support
reduced vertical separation using the oceanic CDTI concept
be achieved?
(6) Can a method be devised for providing adequate separation
in the face of heavy turbulence if vertical separation is
reduced?
(7) What will actual aircraft densities be in the oceanic track
system at peak periods[ Are these densities high enough
that there would be a voice frequency saturation problem[
(8) Would the frequency of CDTI alerts, or the monitoring
required when they occur, produce an unreasonable increase
in pilot workload under any circumstances?
(9) Do pilots have the ability to make sound judgments in the
variety of situations which they might experience?
(i0) Can the voice procedures and phraseology be standardized?
How difficult would it be for pilots to master them? Could
the resolution negotiation process be successfully
conducted by a pilot who had a native language other than
English?
(ii) Can the pilot successfully resolve blunder encounters with
unequipped targets without voice coordination, as called
for in this concept?
As recommended in the final section of this document, data
collection efforts, cockpit simulation experiments, and further
analysis may help to answer many of these questions.
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SECTION 5
STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING SEPARATION MINIMA
In this section, the selection of candidate schemes for reducing
separation is discussed. The selections start with current oceanic
separation minima, which are then reduced in one or more
dimensions. The selected separation minima represent logical next
steps in reducing aircraft spacing, and are subsequently used in
estimating both benefits and alert rates for the oceanic CDTI system.
Current Oceanic Separation Minima
Track systems in oceanic areas are generally composed of
parallel tracks With multiple flight levels on each track.
Separation minima for these track systems are typically expressed as
a set of three numbers: lateral track separation, longitudinal
spacing, and vertical flight level separation. Any two aircraft
must be separated by the minimum spacing in at least one dimension.
lateral separation is usually expressed in nautlcal miles,
longitudinal spacing in minutes, and vertical separation in feet.
In this document, each set of separation minima will hereafter be
designated by these three numbers, separated by slashes. For
instance, 30/10/2000 will indicate lateral track separation of 56 km
(30 n. ml.), longitudinal spacing of i0 minutes, and vertical
separation of 610 m (2000 it). Composite minima, in which certain
minimum spacings must be applied in two dimensions simultaneously,
have also been used in oceanic track systems.
The current separation minima for two oceanic track systems are
pertinent to this study: the North Atlantic (NAT) track system and
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the Central East Pacific (CEP) track system. For the NAT track
system, the current separation minima are 60/10/2000. The current
CEP separation minima are 50/15/2000. The latter is actually a
composite separation standard, since the flight levels used on
alternate tracks are separated by 300 m (i000 ft) in a staggered
fashion. In both systems, the nominal longitudinal spacing is
adjusted by Mach numbers to safely account for differences in speed
between aircraft on the same track and flight level.
Candidate Schemes for Reducing Separation
For the oceanic CDTI study, the current separation minima for
the NAT track system (60/10/2000) were selected as a baseline
against which sets of reduced separation minima could be compared.
This selection was made because the NAT is a larger system than the
CEP (carrying about four times the traffic), and because more
traffic data is available for the NAT. Candidate schemes for
reducing separation were generated basically by halving the baseline
spacing in each dimension. Of the candidate schemes thus derived,
the following four were selected for further evaluation:
(i) Reduce spacing by a factor of one-half in the vertical
dimension only (yielding separation minima of 60/10/1000).
Restrict traffic on each track to one direction only.
(2) Reduce only lateral spacing by a factor of one-half
(yielding separation minima of 30/10/2000).
(3) Reduce only longitudinal spacing by a factor of one-half
(yielding separation minima of 60/5/2000).
(4) Reduce both lateral and longitudinal spacing by a factor of
one-half (yielding separation minima of 30/5/2000).
The first of these candidate schemes (vertical reduction only)
has great potential for reducing flight costs, as will be shown
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later. This schemewas restrictedto one-waytracks in order to
hold the alert rate at a manageablelevel and to limit the potential
for opposlte-dlrectlonencounters. As indicatedearlier,the use of
one-way tracksis consistentwith common practicein the NAT.
The remaining three candidate schemes represent all combinations
of horizontal spacing reductions by a factor of one-half. It was
felt that each of these schemes should be feasible, in terms of
alert rates and safety levels, for use with the oceanic CDTI
system. It was further felt that reductions in vertical spacing
would cause a greater increase in potential conflicts than
reductions in any other dimension. For this reason, it was decided
not to consider simultaneous reductions in both vertical and
horizontal separation.
In addition to the four candidate strategies listed above, a
number of other strategies were considered briefly and discarded.
For example, composite separation minima were considered, but were
deemed too complex for analysis in this limited study. Spacing
reductions of more than one-half were also briefly considered. In
the vertical dimension, the limited accuracy of today's altimetry
systems makes this idea implausible. Lateral spacing reductions of
more than one-half are probably not feasible because of the limited
ability of Minimum TCAS II to recognize, and avoid alerts for,
encounters having large horizontal miss distances. Reductions of
more than one-half in longitudinal spacing may be possible with the
oceanic CDTI system, but it was felt that such reductions could
result in a type of statlonkeeplng operation which is inappropriate
for transoceanic flight.
The four strategies listed above were subsequently evaluated in
terms of potential benefits, alert rates, and transition
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strategies. The strategies were compared with each other and with
the baseline separation minima in terms of overall merit.
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SECTION6
MODIFICATIONS TO TCAS II
This section describes the modifications to TCAS II which would
be necessary to implement the avionics portion of the oceanic CDTI
concept. These modifications include increased surveillance range,
new message formats and protocols for acquisition of CDTl-equipped
intruders, logic modifications, and new display requirements.
Unless otherwise noted, the changes described below apply only to
the oceanic mode of operation.
New Message Formats and Protocols
As mentionedin the introduction,the oceanicCDTI conceptcalls
for one CDTI-equippedaircraftto be able to identifyanother
CDTI-equlppedaircraftand to acquireits call sign. These
requirementscan be met by the use of an alr-to-alrinterrogation
and reply sequenceusing long (ll2-blt)Mode S messageformats.
The current TCAS design already provides a means for TCAS II to
identify another aircraft's TCAS equipage, if any. Dedicated bits
in the Mode S air-to-air surveillance reply formats are reserved for
this purpose. TCAS equipage inherently includes the ability to
transmit and receive air-to-air interrogations and replies using
long message formats. Therefore, a TCAS-equipped aircraft will
always respond to an interrogation with a long reply if a long reply
is requested. These facts help to simplify the addition of a CDTI
message protocol.
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Figure 2 shows the formats of the long Mode S air-to-alr
messages used by TCAS. Each long format contains a 56-blt field
(designated MU for interrogations and MV for replies) which can be
used for general-purpose messages. The first 8 bits of this field
form a subfield (designated UDS for interrogations and VDS for
replies) which indicates the type of message. The use of the
remaining 48 bits depends on the message type.
The CDTI message protocol might work as follows: Once a
CDTl-equlpped aircraft has established a track on a TCAS-equlpped
intruder, it sends a long interrogation to the target aircraft with
the RL field set to 1 (requesting a long reply). A special UDS code
is used to designate the interrogation as a CDTI call-sign request.
The remainder of the MU field is not used. The target aircraft, if
CDTl-equlpped, responds with a long reply containing a special VDS
code to indicate CDTI equipage. (This special VDS code might be the
same as that used in the UDS subfield of the interrogation.) The
target aircraft's call sign is encoded in the remaining 48 bits of
the MV field. The target aircraft uses an identical
Interrogatlon-reply sequence to obtain the call sign of own
aircraft. If the target aircraft is not CDTl-equipped, it still
sends a long reply, but the 56-blt MV field is left empty (is set
entirely to zeros). All other fields in the interrogation and reply
are set as specified in the TCAS II MOPS (Reference 2).
The encoding of an aircraft's call sign could be done in one of
several ways. One way would simply be to encode each character into
a separate 6-bit subfield. An alternative method would be to encode
the call sign according to the Unified Data Link (UDL) conventions
which are currently under joint development by the FAA and
Eurocontrol. Either method would allow up to eight characters
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INTERROGATION
I I I I I I I I I
FIELD l UF I --l RL l AV l AQ I --I MU J AP J
i J J I I I I I I
LENGTH 5 3 i 4 1 18 56 24
(BI_)
Definitions:
UF = Upllnk format number (=16)
RL = Reply length
AV = TCAS maneuver advisory
AQ = Acquisition flag
MU = Interrogation message
AP = Address/parlty
REPLY
I I I I I I I J I I I
FIELD J DF J VS J -- l SL I- l RI l- I AC I MV l AP l
I I I I I I I I I I I
LENGTH 5 1 2 3 2 4 2 13 56 24
(BITS)
Definitions:
DF = Downllnk format number (=16)
VS = Vertical status
SL = TCAS II sensitivity level report
I%1= Air-to-alr reply information
AC = Altitude code
MV = Reply message
AP = Address/parlty
Figure 2. - Long Mode S alr-to-alr message formats.
29
to be encoded, which should be sufficient. (The International Civil
Aviation Organization's model flight plan allows a maximum of seven
characters to be used for aircraft identification.)
The entry and readout of an aircraft's call sign is an eminently
practical idea. For commerical operations, an airline's two-letter
designator and flight number could be keyed in by the flight crew at
the beginning of the flight. For private aircraft, the registration
marking (tail number) could be semi-permanently encoded via rotary
switches or other means. The automatic readout of an aircraft's
call sign is not a new idea, as it is already being planned as an
option for Mode S ground stations.
Logic Modifications
A number of modifications to the TCAS II logic would be
necessary to implement the oceanic CDTI concept. One change would
be the enlargement of the boundaries for issuing a proximity
advisory. This would be necessary to allow a pilot to take nearby
traffic into account when considering a maneuver for any reason.
Specific parameters for the CDTI proximity advisory have not been
selected in this study; however, this subject is discussed later in
this section under the heading of "Display Requirements".
The most important TCAS logic modification would be the creation
of a "CDTI alert" by enlarging the boundaries for a TCAS threat
advisory. Under the oceanic CDTI concept, the resolution of an
apparent conflict should be an infrequent, but routine matter.
Therefore, the boundaries for a CDTI alert should allow the pilots
enough time to negotiate a resolution strategy and to make routine
resolution maneuvers, when required. Parameter values should allow
for a worst-case situation. Each of these requirements will be
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consideredin the subsectionswhich follow. Reasonableparameter
values for the CDTI alert will be determined.
Time factors.- A CDTI alert must give the pilot sufficienttime
to: (i) recognizethe alert and consultthe trafficdisplayto
assess the situation,(2) establishvoice contactwith the pilot of
the threataircraft,if necessary,and agree upon the action to be
taken, and (3) make a routinemaneuver,if necessary,to ensure safe
separation. The time requiredfor each of these activitieswill be
consideredseparately.
An FAA study of pilot response delays to collision avoidance
advisories was conducted in 1979 (Reference 4) using cockpit
simulation. In this study, the mean response time was found to be
about 5.6 seconds, with a standard deviation of 2.1 seconds. To
allow for slow response, plus a few extra seconds for studying the
traffic display, a value of 15 seconds will be assumed for pilot
response to a CDTI alert.
The time required for two pilots to establish radio contact and
agree upon a resolution strategy depends upon a number of factors,
including conflict geometry. For this limited study, a number of
sample conversations were enacted and timed with a stopwatch. On
this basis, it was estimated that 45 seconds would normally be
adequate for such a conversation. No particular accuracy is claimed
for this result, as only cockpit simulation could provide a more
accurate estimate of the actual time requirement.
The time requirement for resolution maneuvers, based upon
worst-case geometry, is estimated in the following subsection.
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Analysis of Worst-Case Geometry. - The time required for a
routine resolution maneuver depends upon several things: the
aircraft velocities, the conflict geometry, the desired minimum
separation, and one's definition of a routine maneuver. For this
study, it was decided somewhat arbitrarily that a routine vertical
maneuver would consist of no more than 0.25 g acceleration to a
final climb or descent rate of 2.5 m/s (500 ft/min). Likewise, it
was decided that a routine horizontal maneuver would consist of a
turn using a bank angle of no more than 0.35 radlans (20 deg),
achieved with a roll rate of 0.087 rad/s (5 degis). The desired
minimum separation was chosen to be 9.3 km (5 n. mi.) laterally and
230 meters (750 feet) vertically. These values should allow safe
passage, while helping to prevent the issuance of positive TCAS II
resolution advisories in most cases. Finally, a maximum airspeed of
310 m/s (600 knots) was assumed for each aircraft.
Figure 3 illustratesthe worst-caseverticaland horizontal
geometriesselectedfor analysis. In calculatingthe time
requirements,it was assumedthat the aircraft performcomplementary
resolutionmaneuvers. The verticalcase involvestwo coaltitude
aircraftconverginghead-on. It was assumedthat the descending
aircraftcan achievethe desiredverticalrate of 2.5 m/s (500
ft/min),but that the climbingaircraft can achieveonly half of
this rate. The horizontalcase also involvestwo head-onaircraft
on a collisioncourse. In this case, it is assumed that both
aircraftcan achievethe desiredbank angle and roll rate. In the
horizontalgeometry,both aircraftwere assumed to be flying at the
maximumairspeed of 310 m/s (600knots).
Analysisof the verticalcase, as describedabove, indicates
that approximately60 secondsare requiredto achieve the desired
separationof 230 meters (750feet). In the horizontalcase, it can
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1.27 m/s
(250 ft/min) ......-_,"
Aircraft #I s...s _'_ Aircraft #2
_...._ _ Collision course --9,,_
\ 111"_
0.25 g 11 0.25 g
acceleration 11 acceleration
I
112.54 m/s
*_ (500 ft/min)
HORIZONTAL
Bank angle :
0.35 tad
Aircraft #i (20 deg)j,;_ Aircraft #2310 m/s 310 m/s
(600 knots) 1 1 (600 knots)
_ Collision course I _ .._____
I
Roll rate: f/ Roll rate:
0.087 rad/s f 0.087 rad/s
(5 deg/s) / Bank angle:0.35 rad (5 deg/s)
(20 deg)
Figure 3.-Worst-case geometries.
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be shown that roughly 54 seconds are needed to achieve the desired
lateral separation of 9.3 km (5 n. mi.). Choosing the larger of
these two values yields a maximum maneuver time requirement of 60
seconds.
When the time requirements for pilot response, voice
communications, and routine maneuvers are combined, a total warning
time of 120 seconds is obtained for the worst-case geometry.
Because of the very conservative selection of a worst-case geometry,
this figure is believed to represent an upper bound on the required
warning time. Simulation may show that a smaller warning time is
adequate, especially in a one-way track system where the probability
of a head-on conflict is very small.
Selectlon of CDTIAIert Parameters
In this subsection, parameters are derived for the CDTI alert in
both the horizontal and vertical dimensions.
Horizontal parameters. - Horizontal boundaries for TCAS II
advisories are usually expressed in the form:
Tau (modified) - R - D _ Th (1)
- VR
where R is current range to the target and VR is range rate of the
target. The formula includes two parameters, D and Th. D is a
distance modifier, and Th is a modlfled-tau threshold. If all
encounters involved a high closure rate, only the Th parameter
would be required. The distance modifier D provides extra
protection against slow-closing intruders which may unexpectedly
maneuver toward own aircraft.
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For the CDTI alert a distance modifier of 9.3 km (5 n. ml.) was
chosen. This value seemed to provide adequate protection against
slow-closing intruders. Using this value for D, a value for the
modlfled-tau threshold can be computed, based upon 120 seconds
warning prior to closest approach for the worst-case horizontal
geometry. For a collision course, true tau (-R/VR) exactly equals
the time to closest approach. Therefore, substituting D = 9.3 km (5
n. mi.) and VR = -0.62 km/s (1200 knots) into equation (i),
letting -R/VR equal 120 seconds, and solving for Th yields a
value of 105 seconds for the Th parameter.
As pointed out earlier, Minimum TCAS II cannot readily filter
out encounters with large miss distances based purely upon tau
logic. This is why tau-dot logic has been tested for use with TCAS
(see Appendix C). In a parallel track system, encounters involving
large miss distances will be the rule rather than the exception.
Therefore, it is considered important that a horizontal miss
distance filter such as the tau-dot logic be used for filtering CDTI
alerts. In the rest of this report, tau-dot logic with a threshold
of 0.96 is assumed to be included as part of the CDTI alert logic.
Vertical parameters. - In the vertical dimension, the TCAS II
threat advisory parameters include both a relative altitude
threshold and a vertical tau threshold, as previously explained.
For high-altitude encounters, an alert may be issued if two aircraft
are within 370 m (1200 ft) of each other, or are projected to cross
altitudes within 45 seconds. In the oceanic track system, the
relative altitude threshold is the more important parameter, since
most encounters will involve aircraft in level flight or with very
modest vertical rates. The tau threshold becomes more important
when one aircraft is transitioning to another altitude.
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The existingTCAS II verticalalert parametersaccount for
altimetrysystem errors,as well as Mode C quantizationerror.
Since these errorsare no differentfor over-oceanflight than for
high-altitudeflight in general,it seems reasonablethat the
currentverticalparametersfor threatadvisoriesnot be increased
furtherfor CDTI alerts. With these parameters,any vertical
closurerate of 3.0 m/s (600 ft/min)or less would provideat least
two minutesof warningin the vertical dimension.
Table 1 summarizesthe CDTI alert parameterschosen for this
study.
Increased Range and Power Requirements
The maximum surveillance range for TCAS II is currently about 37
km (20 n. mi.). The requirement for an increase in this range would
depend on the manner in which separation minima were reduced. For
the worst-case horizontal geometry (Figure 3), 105 seconds to 9.3 km
(5 n. mi.) occurs at a range of 74 km (40 n. mi.). Therefore, if a
method of reducing the separation minima is proposed which results
in an increased likelihood of head-on encounters, then the effectlve
range of TCAS would have to be approximately doubled. On the other
hand, if reduced minima are proposed in a way that does not increase
the likelihood of head-on encounters (for instance, reduced vertical
spacing using only one-way tracks), then little or no increase in
range may be required.
In the latter situation, a head-on encounter could only occur
because of a major blunder. Such a blunder would be no more likely
to occur than in today's system. While it would be desirable to
have as much warning as possible in the event of such a blunder, it
would not be necessary for the TCAS system to have a range of 74 km
36
TABLE i. - CDTI ALERT PARAMETERS
HorizontalDimension
Distance modifier, D, km ............. 9.3 (5 n. mi.)
Horizontal tau threshold, Th, s ................ 105
Tau-dot threshold, d ................... 0.96
VerticalDimension
Relative altitude threshold, At, m ........ 370 (1200 feet)
Vertical tau threshold, Tv, s ................. 45
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(40 n. mi.). Even if the range of TCAS were not increased beyond 37
km (20 n. ml.), safety would be greater than today's system, since
the TCAS unit would provide at least a one-mlnute warning in such a
blunder situation.
From the viewpoint of the power and range required of TCAS,
then, it is clearly advantageous to reduce separation minima in a
way that does not increase the likelihood of head-on encounters. In
order to help determine the feasibility of reducing separation
minima in ways that do increase this likelihood, the prospects for
increasing the range of TCAS will now be explored.
Since range is proportional to the square root of power, then
doubling the range of TCAS would nominally require a fourfold (6 dB)
increase in both the effective radiated power and the receiver
sensitivity. (The idea of requiring increased transponder power or
sensitivity over the ocean was rejected as being impractical because
it would require modifications to transponders as well as to TCAS
unlts.)
To determine the practicality of doubling the range of TCAS,
several TCAS hardware design engineers were consulted. From these
conversations, two important things were learned. First, an
increase of 6 dB in receiver sensitivity should not be a major
problem; TCAS receiver sensitivity is not maximized, but is adjusted
to provide reliable operation at the maximum design range without
allowing undue interference. Second, an actual increase of 6 dB in
radiated power would present a serious design problem; the
transmitters used on current TCAS engineering models are
state-of-the-art, solid-state devices which operate near their
design limits. An increase of more than 1-2 dB in transmitter
output power is unlikely in the near future with a solid-state
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design. (A new transmitter and power supply design might provide
greater output power, but size, weight, and especially cost might
present major problems.)
In order to double the range of the interrogation link, then, it
may be necessary to achieve an effective increase of 4-5 dB in
radiated power over and above any increase in transmitter output
power. One means of achieving this increase, at least in part,
would be to reduce power losses between the transmitter and the
antenna. A contribution of 1-2 dB of this amount could be achieved
by using cable having less power loss. (Up to 3 dB of cable losses
are tolerated with the current engineering models.) Another i dB
might be achieved by reducing loss in the high level step of the
whlsper/shout attenuator.
Another means of increasing the effective radiated power is with
increased antenna gain (using a narrower beam). It might be
possible to achieve several decibels more antenna gain without
introducing excessive cost and complexity.
Finally, in contrast to what was said above, it might not be
necessary to increase the effective radiated power by a full 6 dB.
The current TCAS design achieves its maximum design range with a
link margin of about 6 dB. (Link margin is the amount by which the
received power level exceeds the receiver sensitivity for the
average transmission.) This link margin is designed into the system
to provide high reliability at the maximum design range. It must
account for such things as irregularities in antenna radiation
patterns, manufacturing tolerances on transmitter and receiver
components, and signal fades due to antenna shielding during banking
maneuvers.
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For the oceanic CDTI system, a smaller llnk margin might be
acceptable for the following reasons:
(i) Reliabilityat maximumrange is less importantfor CDTI
alerts than for resolutionadvisories;a delay of several
secondsin receivinga two-mlnutewarningis less critical
than the same delay in receivinga resolutionadvisoryat
30 secondsbefore closestapproach.
(2) The hlgh-altltudecruiseregime prevalentin an oceanic
track systemwould very rarelyhave aircraftmaneuvering
with significantbank angles,meaningthat very few deep
antennafades should be experienced.
(3) In the baselineCDTI system being consideredhere, all
aircraftoperatingon CDTl-onlytrackswould be
TCAS-equlpped,and thereforewould be using both top and
bottom-mountedantennas. A 1977 study by M.I.T. Lincoln
Laboratory (Reference5) indicatedthat diversityantennas
on both aircraftimprovesllnk reliabilitysignificantly
(1-3 dB less llnk margin requiredfor the same level of
reliability).
In summary,it is not entirelyobvioushow difficultor how
costly it would be to double the range of the TCAS interrogation
link. The near-termability to increasetransmitterpower is
limited. However,some combinationof reducedpower losses,
increasedantennadlrectivity,and decreasedlink margin might make
up the differenceat a reasonablecost. Furtherinvestigationis
requiredin this area.
DisplayRequirements
This subsection discusses the content and form of information
presented to the pilot. It is assumed that the basic pilot display
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would consist of a Plan View Display (PVD) of nearby air traffic on
a Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) or other suitable device.
Display range. - The pilot's display must be designed to show
not only aircraft for which a CDTI alert is issued, but also nearby
aircraft which may affect the pilot's decision on maneuvers. To
begin with, the range limits must allow the display of any aircraft
for which a CDTI alert can be issued. This would mean as much as 74
km (40 n. mi.) ahead, 42 km (23 n. mi.) to each side, 22 km (12 n.
mi.) behind, and 760 m (2500 ft) above and below. In addition, it
is desirable to show aircraft which are nearby, but which are not
closing rapidly enough to trigger a CDTI alert. This can be brought
about by expanding the boundaries for the TCAS proximity advisory.
No specific parameters were developed for the CDTI proximity
advisory in this study. However, these parameters should be
limited, to some extent, to be consistent with the separation
minima, in order to ensure that the screen is not cluttered with
unimportant targets. For instance, if the lateral separation
minimum is 56 km (30 n. mi.), then occasional separations of 46 km
(25 n. mi.) or less may be common. Therefore, the logic for CDTI
proximity advisories should limit lateral range to something on the
order of 37 km (20 n. mi.) in this case. In the longitudinal
dimension, a separation minimum of 5 minutes would mean a spacing of
approximately 74 km (40 n. mi.) between aircraft. Therefore, range
limits of 56 km (30 n. mi.) ahead and 37 km (20 n. mi.) behind might
be appropriate for the CDTI proximity advisory. In the vertical
dimension, it would be desirable to show aircraft which are one
occupied flight level above and below own aircraft, so that the
pilot will be aware of any aircraft in his vicinity at an adjacent
flight level. In such instances, he could then monitor the
heightkeeping performance of his aircraft particularly closely.
Hence, a limit of 1.5 times the standard vertical spacing might be
sensible.
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As an alternative to the fixed display limits, variable limits
might be worthwhile to consider. The appropriate limits might be
selected automatically upon the issuance of a CDTI alert, or
manually, by the pilot, for routine monitoring.
Data blocks.- Each symbol on the display screen representing
another aircraft should be accompanied continuously by a data block
showing that aircraft's altitude and call sign. A special symbol
(such as a question mark) should be used in place of the call sign
to indicate an aircraft not equipped with CDTI. Altitude could be
displayed either as an absolute flight level for the target or as a
relative indication of the target's altitude with respect to own
(i.e., hundreds of feet above or below own flight level). Each
method has its advantages and disadvantages. The current consensus
among TCAS designers is that relative altitude is superior for
collision avoidance purposes. Because of the frequent need to
exchange and compare assigned and actual flight level data, however,
it seems that absolute values would be preferred for the oceanic
CDTI application. Other items of information might be useful in the
data block. For instance, an upward or downward arrow following the
altitude could be used to indicate that a target aircraft has a
significant vertical rate. It is also desirable that the data block
flash, and/or be presented in a special color, during a CDTI alert
for that aircraft. A final recommendation is that the display
software should have provisions to prevent the overlap of data
blocks.
Other display features. - The following additional display
features should be given serious consideration for use with the
oceanic CDTI system:
(I) Trails - It may be desirable to display a short trail of an
intruder's previous positions as an aid in estimating speed
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and direction of flight. One potential problem with this
idea is that the bearing accuracy of Minimum TCAS II is
limited. (The standard deviaton of bearing error is
roughly 8-9 degrees.) This could tempt a pilot to put more
faith in the apparent heading of an intruder than he should.
(2) Range ring - It may be desirable to include a range ring of
perhaps 9.3 km (5 n. mi.) radius about own aircraft's
positon as an aid in estimating horizontal distances.
Optionally, the size of the range ring could be selectable
(automatically or manually).
(3) Aural annunciation - Current plans call for each new TCAS
threat advisory to be accompanied by an aural annunciation
of moderate urgency. This feature must be retained for
CDTI alerts.
Figure 4 shows an example of a CDTI display screen. In this
example, own heading is straight up, altitudes are presented as
absolute flight levels, and position trails are used. Own flight
level appears below the symbol for own aircraft.
Other Equipment Modifications
In normal operation over land areas, the TCAS II system serves
only as a backup to the regular air traffic control system for
ensuring aircraft separation. In the oceanic CDTI concept, however,
more routine use is made of the TCAS system. This increased
dependence calls for a high degree of reliability. Several
self-test and monitoring features are already required of Minimum
TCAS II to help assure that failures are recognized. One additional
requirement is placed on the TCAS unit for supporting oceanic CDTI.
This requirement is for a push-to-test switch which the pilot can
activate while airborne to provide a momentary display of all
targets being tracked by his TCAS. These can be displayed in either
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Figure 4.-Example of CDTI display screen.
44
a tabular form or with position symbols on the CDTI display. The
pilot would be required to activate this switch before entering the
oceanic track system and to observe that his TCAS actually had one
or more targets in track.
Reliability might also be enhanced by providing redundancy for
critical system components. It must be remembered, however, that in
the baseline CDTI system, all aircraft operating on CDTl-only tracks
would be CDTl-equipped. It is extremely unlikely that the CDTI
systems on both aircraft in a conflict would fail simultaneously.
This natural redundancy adds a great deal to system reliability.
In addition to the above modifications, the CDTI unit (or
perhaps the Mode S transponder, if it is a separate unit) must have
a provision for the pilot to enter his ATC call sign once per
flight, or else the call sign must be permanently encoded.
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SECTION 7
PROPOSED PILOT PROCEDURES
Possible procedures for use of a CDTI system in oceanic areas
are described in this section. These procedures are considered
feasible and reasonable by the authors; of course, if CDTI were to
be adopted for oceanic use, final procedures would be developed by
an ICAO committee after extensive study and review.
Possible procedures to be used prior to reaching oceanic
airspace are described first. Those used within oceanic airspace
follow.
Procedures Undertaken Prior to Reaching Oceanic Airspace
Greater dependence is placed upon a TCAS unit supporting a CDTI
service of the type described in this report than on a TCAS unit
used in airspace subject to radar control. This is true because the
separation minima have been reduced due to the use of TCAS in the
former case, whereas they have not been changed in the latter.
Ensuring proper operation of TCAS units supporting over-ocean CDTI
service is important because of this greater dependence on the
equipment. For this reason, the pilot would be required to perform
a pre-fllght test of the TCAS unit and to observe the correct
results as indicated by the manufacturer's procedures. (Such a test
capability, called a self-test, is required to be implemented in a
TCAS unit by the TCAS MOPS (Reference 2).) If the TCAS unit were to
fall the pre-fllght test, the pilot would be prohibited from flying
an oceanic track using reduced separation.
Prior to takeoff the pilot would be required to enter the call
sign for the flight into his TCAS avionics (or into the associated
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Mode S transponder if the transponder is a separate device). The
call sign would be the same as that used in filing flight plans and
in voice communications with air traffic control (ATC).
Just prior to or immediatelyafter takeoffthe pilot would
switchhis TCAS unit to normal TCAS operation. (This is assuming
that the countryfromwhich he departspermitsoperationof TCAS in
its airspace.) Normal TCAS operationmeans use of the standard
power levelsand conditionsspelledout in Reference2. Assuming
that the pilot departsfrom airspacewhere radar controlis being
exercised,the pilot would observenormalATC proceduresappropriate
for a radar controlenvironment.
A second test to provide a further indication of correct
operation of the TCAS unit would be required after takeoff. The
pilot would be required to activate the pust-to-test switch while
his TCAS was operating in the normal mode (as opposed to the oceanic
mode) and to observe that some targets were in track.
Once the pilot had been released on his assigned track and had
been given clearance to leave the ATC VHF voice frequency, he would
configure for oceanic CDTI operation. He would switch his TCAS unit
to the oceanic mode and would tune his VHF radio to the CDTI
monitoring frequency. He would then observe the procedures
described in the following subsections.
Procedures Used Within Oceanic Airspace
Most of the discussionin the followingsubsectionsdeals with
the proceduresto be followedwhen a target is displayedthat is
CDTI-equippedand when both own aircraftand the target are flying
assignedtracks. There is some possibilityof the pilot
encounteringa targetunder other conditions,and proceduresto
cover these situationsare also discussedbriefly.
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Procedures When the TCAS System Has Not Given a CDT1 Alert
In routine conditions, the pilot may wish to glance at his CDTI
display periodically. From time to time it may happen that there
will be a CDTI proximity advisory displayed for a target. The most
likely circumstance giving rise to this display is one in which own
aircraft and the target are flying the same track in the same
direction at adjacent flight levels. In this situation, the target
may remain on the display for an extended period. The pilot may
want to check the other aircraft's position periodically. If the
target is at a very close horizontal range, the pilot will want to
ensure that his own aircraft remains close to its assigned flight
level and will want to confirm that the target is also following its
assigned flight level closely.
During times of heavy turbulence when it may be difficult to
prevent significant excursions from assigned flight level, it should
be helpful for the pilot to know of the presence of another
aircraft. Using the CDTI display, the pilot might want to offset
his course Just slightly to the right or left of the track
centerline to provide an extra dimension of protection against an
extreme excursion from assigned flight level.
Although the pilot is not required to make voice contact for a
proximity advisory, the pilot may still wish to do so and to confirm
that the target's flight level shown on his own display is the same
as that being displayed in the target's cockpit. (There are certain
types of altimeter and encoding system errors that can result in the
flight level reported by the target's transponder being different
from the flight level displayed on the altimeter in the target's
cockpit.) Care should be taken to avoid excessive conversation on
the designated VHF frequency, but brief conversations when the
channel is otherwise clear could be permitted.
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The display of a proximate target can also be useful for
monitoring the target after action has been taken as the result of a
CDTI alert for that target. The CDTI alert occurred because the
target was close or converging. Once action has been taken and the
aircraft are separating, the CDTI alert condition will be taken
away, but the CDTI proximity advisory will keep the target displayed
until it is out of range.
Procedures When a CDTI Alert Occurs
There are a variety of situations that may exist when a CDTI
alert occurs. There are several steps which should be taken
initially in any of these situations.
The first step following the CDTI alert should be to assess the
urgency of the situation. In the great majority of cases there
should be sufficient time to make voice contact with the other pilot
and to mutually agree on a resolution. But in a few cases,
immediate action may be required. If this is the case, the pilot
should take whatever action appears to be warranted and should
immediately make a call on the designated VHF frequency in the clear
to indicate his call sign and the actions he is taking. As soon as
possible he should try to contact the other pilot and agree on the
next steps to be taken.
Assuming that the situation is not critical, the pilot should
attempt to make voice contact with the pilot of the target
aircraft. He should first establish whether or not the target's
TCAS also is providing a display of his own aircraft in the target's
cockpit. If so, he should proceed to work out a resolution with the
other pilot. Depending upon the nature of the encounter, it may be
helpful in this process to exchange information about the assigned
track, flight level, Mach number, or heading.
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If the target's TCAS does not have own aircraft displayed, the
pilot of own aircraft should query the other pilot for his assigned
track, flight level, and Mach number, and should then develop a
suggested course of action for his own aircraft. This should be
communicated to the target aircraft along with a suggested course of
action for the target aircraft, if appropriate. A pilot should not
view himself as giving instructions to the other aircraft, since the
CDTI display on own aircraft may not show all traffic in the
vicinity of the target aircraft. He would only offer a suggestion
when there was an obvious course of action for the target aircraft.
An example would be when the target aircraft was observed to be 300
feet below its assigned altitude. In this case, the suggestion
could be made that the pilot of the target aircraft climb to his
assigned altitude.
If the target's TCAS does have own aircraft displayed, the
pilots should agree on the resolution and then begin to carry it
out. As they do so, they may wish to confirm that each TCAS has the
same view of the situation. This can be done by verbally exchanging
the flight level of the target and the range of the target as seen
by each TCAS.
If the pilot is unable to contact the pilot of the target
aircraft on the designated frequency, he should determine his best
course of action using the available information. He should then
communicate his intentions along with his call sign in the clear.
He should monitor the progress of the resolution on his CDTI display
and should continue to try to establish voice contact with the
target aircraft.
The discussion thus far has assumed that own pilot was the one
to initiate voice contact. Often, the other pilot may be first to
make contact. When this happens, own pilot should check his CDTI
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display to see if the other aircraft is displayed. If not, the
pilot should.respond to all communications from the other pilot and
should check his current flight level, Mach number, and position
against their assigned values. If own aircraft is off the assigned
values, own pilot should suggest that he return to the assigned
values and should do so after the other pilot agrees. In most
cases, the target will appear shortly after the other pilot has
initiated voice contact, and own pilot will be able to monitor the
progress of the actions.
If the target aircraft is displayed at the time the other pilot
initiates voice contact, own pilot should respond to questions and
should check his own position against his assigned flight path. He
should mutually agree to a course of action and monitor the progress
of the resolution.
Once the situation has been restored to normal, the pilot should
attempt to understand why the TCAS provided a CDTI alert in this
situation. If a navigation error is involved, the cause could be
flight technical error_ measurement error, or a combination of the
two. Flight technical error is when the basic position, flight
level, or Mach number measurements are correct, but the aircraft,
because of autopilot or manual error, has not closely followed the
assigned flight path. In this case the cockpit instruments will
show that the aircraft is not on the assigned flight path.
Measurement error is when the navigation instruments indicate that
the aircraft is on the correct flight path, but they are actually in
error. In most cases, the actual cause of the CDTI alert should be
evident to the pilots of the two aircraft if they exchange
additional information such as latltude/longitude coordinates, TCAS
range, or other cockpit indications. If the cause can be attributed
to measurement error in one aircraft, the pilot should make a note
of the particulars and have the appropriate equipment inspected at
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his destination. Depending upon the nature and severity of the
problem, the pilot may also consider coordinating a change of flight
plan with the oceanic control system in order to fly on tracks using
normal rather than reduced separation, or to depart from the track
system altogether.
Appendix A contains additional pilot procedures appropriate for
specific encounter geometries.
Procedures for an Encounter With a Target Not Equipped With CDTI
The TCAS unit is able to track aircraft which have only an
operating ATC beacon transponder, as well as aircraft which are
equipped with TCAS. The former will be referred to as CDTI -
unequipped or just unequipped aircraft. (There is the possibility
that some aircraft could operate on the oceanic track system wlth
TCAS II equipment that does not have the oceanic mode implemented.
Such equipment would be technically interoperable with the TCAS unit
having the oceanic mode. If this normal TCAS II equipment were
operated in the oceanic track system, additional procedures to
handle these interactions would have to be developed. For the
moment, this possibility is overlooked.) All aircraft operating
within the oceanic track systems are required to carry beacon
transponders and, as a matter of practice, the airlines keep them
turned on throughout their oceanic flight. Thus, all aircraft
operating in the oceanic airspace are potentially able to be tracked
by TCAS.
In the concept described in this document, reduced separation
would not be used between CDTl-equipped and unequipped aircraft.
Nonetheless, there could be large navigational errors that cause an
unequipped aircraft to generate a CDTI alert or CDTI proximity
advisory. The TCAS unit would use the same criteria to determine
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when a target qualifies for a CDTI alert or a CDTI proximity
advisory for both equipped and unequipped targets. However,
different symbols could be used to represent equipped and unequipped
targets on the display. There would be no call sign displayed for
unequipped targets.
It has been a deliberate decision not to make provisions for
dealing with unequipped aircraft in the baseline concept for oceanic
CDTI. The idea of extending the concept to include unequipped
aircraft is briefly explored in Section 13 of this report. However,
it is felt that the advantages of positive voice contact and of the
pilots in both aircraft being able to view the encounter geometry
independently would be extremely important in allowing users to gain
confidence in the concept. Once experience with the concept as
presently proposed has been gained, the decision to include
unequipped features in the concept can be revisited.
Trying to establish voice contact with an unequipped target
would be awkward at best. Trying to communicate via a query such as
"Aircraft in the vicinity of 51 degrees North and 54 degrees West at
flight level SS0, this is XYZ 53, do you read?" would require a long
time for a response and would preoccupy the pilot of the
CDTl-equipped aircraft. It is felt that the advantage of
coordinating actions through such a voice procedure might be
outweighed by the complexity of the procedure. However, it is
thought that there is a safety advantage to displaying an unequipped
target when it satisfies the CDTI alert or CDTI proximity advisory
criteria. Because the normal separation minima would be applied
between equipped and unequipped aircraft, the appearance of an
unequipped target on the display implies that there has been a
larger navigation error or blunder than would be the case for an
equipped target.
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No detailedprocedures for responding to a CDTI alert againstan
unequippedtarget can be suggested. In general,the pilot should
study the displayfor a brief time, if possible. If it appearsthat
the targetis maintaininglevel flight,the pilot may prefer to
changealtitude. Otherwise,the pilot should choosean action that
would appear to providethe most positiveseparationin view of the
target'sobservedpositionand velocityhistory. The pilot should
notify the oceaniccontrolsystem of the encounterand convey the
detailsas soon as the encounterhas been resolved.
Procedures if a TCAS Resolution Advisory Appears
When the oceanic CDTI system is operated in the oceanic mode, it
would use the previously described logic to determine CDTI alerts
and CDTI proximity advisories. It is also proposed that the
resolution advisory logic that is used in the normal TCAS mode
continue to be used without modification in the oceanic mode. Under
these conditions, the appearance of a TCAS resolution advisory in
the oceanic mode would be a very uncommon event. It is even less
likely that such a resolution advisory would contradict
pilot-negotlated resolution actions. The following describes the
suggested procedures to be used when a TCAS resolution advisory
appears in the oceanic mode.
If a TCAS resolution advisory appears, there would usually have
been a CDTI alert on the same target at an earlier time. In this
case, it is likely that the pilot has already made voice contact
with the other pilot and has agreed on a course of action. If so,
the pilot may have more information available than the TCAS system.
Also, if the pilot of either aircraft had made a maneuver as a
result of voice coordination just at the time that the TCAS unit
selected a resolution advisory, the TCAS resolution advisory could
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be invalid because it was based on the geometry before the
maneuver. For these several reasons, the pilot would not be bound
to strictly observe the TCAS resolution advisories. However, at the
time the resolution advisory first appeared the pilot would be
required to quickly reassess the situation, taking into account the
resolution advisory being displayed and all other information
available to him. He should realize that it is likely that the TCAS
in the other aircraft has also displayed a resolution advisory. The
two TCAS units have conducted electronic coordination to ensure that
one aircraft has displayed a "climb" advisory and the other has
displayed a "descend" advisory. He should consider whether some
other course of action is now required. The fact that the
resolution advisory came up at all may imply that the previous
resolution action is not producing adequate separation. It
certainly implies that the aircraft are close or are converging
rapidly and that immediate attention is required.
In unusual situations, a TCAS resolution advisory might appear
with no previous warning. (An example of such a situation might be
when another aircraft initiates a sudden rapid descent from an
altitude of 760 m (2500 ft) or more above own aircraft. By the time
the TCAS unit has recognized the rapid descent, the criteria for
both a CDTI alert and a TCAS resolution advisory could have been
satisfied.) If this happens, the pilot should quickly assess the
CDTI display and the resolution advisory and, if the resolution
advisory seems reasonable, should immediately initiate a maneuver in
compliance with the resolution advisory. As he initiates the
maneuver, he should check his display to verify that the maneuver
will not place him in conflict with another aircraft. As soon as he
has taken these actions he should make a call in the clear on the
designated VHF frequency, giving his call sign and the action that
he is taking. When the immediate threat has been eliminated, the
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pilot should make voice contact with the pilot of the target
aircraft and agree on a safe way to return to his assigned flight
path.
The chance of TCAS resolution advisories occurring which
contradict pilot-negotiated resolution maneuvers is explored further
in Section 12 of this report.
Procedures If TCAS Fails While in the Oceanic Track System
The TCAS unit is required by Reference 2 to have a failure
monitor function which provides essentially continuous monitoring
for failure of key elements of the TCAS equipment. When this
monitor senses that the TCAS is not capable of performing its
required functions, it provides a warning to the pilot. If the
pilot becomes aware, as a result of this warning or in some other
way, that the TCAS has failed, he would be required to contact the
oceanic control system and receive clearance to another track or
altitude that will separate his aircraft from other aircraft by the
normal rather than the reduced separation minima. The pllot should
malntaln his assigned track, flight level, and Mach number until he
has received a new clearance. If the Mode S transponder supporting
the TCAS unlt is still serviceable, it should be kept in operation.
If not, and the aircraft carries a backup Mode S or ATC transponder,
this should be activated.
Procedures for Notifying the Oceanic Control System of an Encounter
It is suggested that it would not normally be necessary to
notify the oceanic control system of a CDTI alert, or of
action taken as a result of it, if the pilot were to return
immediately to his assigned track, flight level, and Mach number.
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There would normally be no reason from an air traffic control point
of view to contact the control system, because the control system
has no surveillance capability and has no direct communication with
the aircraft. (There might, however, be a requirement to report
each encounter in order to generate data that could support analysis
of navigation accuracy or estimates of the safety of the oceanic
track system with its reduced separation minima.) However, there
are certain situations in which the pilot should be required to
contact the control system. They are:
(i) There has been an encounter between two CDTl-equlpped
aircraft which were flying the same track in the same
direction at the same flight level. The trailing aircraft
has closed on the lead aircraft, and the pilots are not
able to resolve the discrepancy in Mach number. The pilot
of the trailing aircraft must contact the control system
and receive a clearance to a new altitude or track.
(2) Following an encounter, the pilot realizes that, due to a
blunder, he has crossed an adjacent track or flight level.
Before returning to the correct track or flight level, the
pilot should contact the oceanic control system.
(3) The pilot must receive clearance from the oceanic control
system before making any permanent change in track, flight
level, or Mach number.
(4) If, as the result of an encounter, the pilot suspects
faulty navigation equipment, he must contact the oceanic
control system.
(5) The pilot should report the specific information related to
any encounter with an unequipped target.
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Illustrative Voice Conversations
In this section, four situations giving rise to CDTI alerts are
described, and voice conversations that might take place to
negotiate resolutions of these situations are presented. In the
following, the fictitious call sign XYAIR 62 is used to represent
own aircraft and UVLINES 137 is used to represent the target.
Situation i. - Reduced vertical separation of 300 km (i000 ft)
is being applied. Both own aircraft and the target are eastbound on
track V, own aircraft at flight level 310 and the target at flight
level 320. Own aircraft has been slowly overtaking thetarget. Own
pilot observes the target on his CDTI display as a proximity target
15 n. mi. ahead and initiates voice contact.
Own: "UVLINES 137, this is XYAIR 62, do you read?"
Target: "Calling UVLINES 137, say again."
Own: "UVLINES 137, this is XYAIR 62, I show you as a CDTI
target 15 miles ahead at flight level 317. What track
and flight level are you flying?"
Target: "XYAIR 62, this is UVLINES 137, my CDTI also shows you
15 miles at my six o'clock at flight level 310. We
are flying track Victor at flight level 320. Our
altitude has drifted low. We will climb back to 320
and hold that."
Own: "Roger, UVLINES 137, we are also on track Victor. It
looks like we are closing on you and will pass below.
We will keep our altitude close to 310."
Situation 2. - Reduced lateral separation of 56 km (30 n. mi.)
is being used. Own aircraft and the target are westbound on
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adjacent tracks at the same flight level. Own aircraft is assigned
track C and the target is assigned track D, both at flight level
330. Track D is to the left of own aircraft.
Target: "XYAIR 62, this is UVLINES 137, do you read?"
Own: "UVLINES 137, XYAIR 62, go ahead."
Target: "XYAIR 62, I just got a CDTI alert on you. I show you
at about three o'clock at 8 miles. What track are you
flying?"
Own: "UVLINES 137, I also show you at 8 miles at my nine
o'clock. We are flying track Charlie and are within 5
miles of centerllne. What is your track and heading?"
Target: "We are on track Delta, heading 268. Our nay shows us
on course. I suggest we turn left and you turn right
until we get this straightened out."
Own: "UVLINES 137, I agree. We are turning right to 270.
We'll check our nay system."
(After a pause)
Own: 'tOurnay coordinates show us on course at 56 39 north,
35 12 west. What is your position?"
Target: "UVLINES 137 is currently at 56 29 North, 35 15 West."
(After a Pause)
Own: "UVLINES 137, your coordinates plot well north of
Track Delta. Have you checked your waypolnts?"
(After a Pause)
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Target: "XYAIR, we're sorry. We had a bad waypoint entered.
The new one has been entered and it shows us well
right of course. We will take a heading of 240 to get
back on course."
Own: "O.K. we'll come back to 260 for a while.
Situation 3. - Reduced lateral separation of 56 km (30 n. mi.)
is being applied. Own aircraft is westbound on track E at flight
level 350 and the target is eastbound on track F at flight level
350. Track F is south of track E and is to the left of own
aircraft. Own TCAS does not have a display for the targe_ at the
time that the target's pilot initiates voice contact.
Target: "XYAIR 62, this is UVLINES 137, do you read?"
Own: "Calling XYAIR 62, I read you loud and clear."
Target: "This is UVLINES 137, I have a CDTI alert on you,
nearly dead ahead at 35 miles, at my altitude. We are
on track Foxtrot. What is your track?"
Own: "We are on track Echo. I have no display on you."
Target: "XYAIK 62, it looks like we wlll pass wlth about i0
miles separation. We are turning right. Suggest you
turn right, also."
Own: "UVLINES 137, we have you now. We are turning right
to 280. We show you at 10 o'clock, 25 miles."
Target: "Our display shows you at 25 miles at about 9 o'clock."
(After a pause)
Target: "XYAIR, we were a little left of course, we're coming
back to centerllne now."
Own: "We were a little left ourselves. We are clear now
and are coming back to a heading of 260."
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Situation 4. - Reduced longitudinal separation is being
applied. Both own aircraft and the target are assigned track W
eastbound at flight level 330. The target has entered the track
first, and own aircraft has been cleared behind it. Own aircraft is
overtaking the target slowly. Own pilot has observed the target as
a proximate target on his display and has noticed that the target is
closing.
Own: "UVLINES137, this is XYAIR 62, do you read?"
Target: "XYAIR62, UVLINES137, go ahead.
Own: "Our CDTI shows you 15 miles ahead at flightlevel
330. Are you flying track Whiskey?"
Target: "That'saffirmative. We also show you 15 miles at six
o'clock."
Own: "We have been closingon you. What Mach number are
you flying?"
Target: "We filed for .80 and have been holding that. What is
your Mach?"
Own: "We filed for .82 and have been holding that. What is
your ground speed?"
Target: "530."
Own: "We have 558. At that rate we will overtakein half
an hour. 137, we will try to get a new altitude from
ATC. We'll slow to 530 ground speed in the meantime."
Target: "Roger."
These sample voice exchanges should help to show that the pilots
are not being asked to memorize complex procedures or resolution
rules. It should be evident that, in most cases, the pilots can
achieve a full image of the situation very quickly and that the
proper resolution actions are quite evident and natural. The
conversation very quickly focuses on exchanging the items of
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information that are required for that particular situation. Items
which might be useful in another context, but which are irrelevant
in the current one are not discussed. From these examples it is
clear that pilots continue to use phraseology familiar to them from
their everyday interactions with air traffic control.
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SECTION 8
ESTIMATIONOF ALERTRATES
In this section, maximum CDTI alert rates are estimated for
various separation minima.
Approach
The technique used to estimate maximum CDTI alert rates is based
on theory developed for determining collision risk (see Reference
6). The technique, as used here, accounts for all alerts except
those caused by the loss of longitudinal separation between aircraft
on the same track at the same flight level. This type of conflict
is discussed separately at the end of this section.
The collision risk model used in this analysis represents an
aircraft by a rectangular box that encloses it, as shown in
Figure 5. The frequency with which another aircraft enters the box
is then estimated using the following equation:
R = P P N + P P N + P P N (2)
A y z x x z y x y z
where N is the expected frequency with which thex
along-track separation shrinks to less than LX.
N and N are similarly defined for the
y z
across-track and vertical directions.
P is the probability that the along-track separation
X
is less than Lx, i.e., the
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Alert occurs when
another aircraft
enters volume.
2Lz
2Ly_ Lx
Figure 5.-Maximum CDTI alert volume.
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proportionof time the aircraftspend in this
condition. P and P are similarlydefinedy z
for the across-trackand verticaldirections.
The first term in equation (2) can be interpreted as giving the
frequency with which another aircraft approaches to less than L
x
in the x-direction times the probability that the separation in the
y and z directions is simultaneously less than _ and LZ. The
other two terms can be interpreted similarly for the cross-track and
vertical directions. This approach assumes that the events of
overlap in each of the three directions are statistically
independent, and that the total alert rate can be determined as the
sum of the alert rates resulting from the three directions
individually.
For this model, the size of the box is chosen based on
distances at which an alert can occur. It is assumed that the
horizontal criteria for an alert will be met if the following
inequality (the tau criterion) is satisfied as the aircraft pass:
R - D <
_VR _ Th (3)
where R = radial distancebetweenthe aircraft
VR = range rate
D = 9 km (5 n. mi.)
Th = 105 s
In addition, the miss distance must be less than that determined by
the tau-dot criterion. (The tau-dot criterion only affects the
y-direction parameters, and is not covered in detail here. See
Appendices B and C for more information).
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To relate the box dimensions to the various parameters, adjacent
routes are assumed with traffic traveling at the separation
minimum. Same and opposite direction route pairs are separately
considered, as are horizontal and vertical encounters.
Opposite-direction aircraft are each assumed to be traveling at 310
m/s (600 knots), while for the same direction, one aircraft is
assumed to be traveling at 260 m/s (500 knots) and overtaking
traffic traveling at 240 m/s (460 knots).
X-Direction. - In the x-direction, the length of the box is
determined by computing the maximum distance at which an alert could
occur, based on worst-case closing speeds of 20 and 620 m/s (40 and
1200 knots) for the same and opposite direction route pairs; that is:
LX = Th[VR[ + D (4)
where IVRI is the closing speed of the aircraft pair.
A method of determining P is described in Reference 6. Thex
approach uses what is sometimes called the "streaming aircraft"
model, where a constant flow of aircraft traveling at the same speed
on parallel routes through a sector is assumed. The number of
passings per sector hour is multiplied by twice the time that the
boxes representing each aircraft are in longitudinal overlap during
each passing (giving the total flight time in longitudinal overlap
per sector hour), and this is then divided by the total flight hours
per sector hour. When applied to the oceanic CDTI scenario, the
following equation results:
%N
Px v (5)
where N is the aircraft entry rate for each route
V is the average ground speed on each route.
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As long as the box length and aircraft entry rates are such that
each aircraft is in overlap with no more than one other aircraft (as
occurred in the cases examined), this number can be interpreted as a
probability. The x-direction parameters are the same for both
horizontal and vertical encounters.
Reference 6 also gives a method of determining Nx, dividing
the fraction of time that an aircraft is in overlap by the average
duration of overlap. When adapted to the oceanic CDTI scenario,
application of equation (5) gives the following result:
P IVRI NN - x _ (6)
x LXIIVR l V
Z-Direction.- For the vertical direction, separations of 610
and 300 m (2000 and 1000 ft) are considered. It is assumed that
aircraft at 300 m (i000 ft) spacing will always meet the criteria
for a vertical alert, i.e., P = i. This is a conservativez
result, as an aircraft pair separated by more than 370 m (1200 ft)
will not meet the criteria. For this case, N = 0; that is, as
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the aircraft are always in vertical overlap, the frequency of
entering into vertical overlap is 0. Aircraft at 610 m (2000 ft)
spacing are assumed never to meet the vertical alert criteria, i.e.,
P = 0. A value of 0 for N also applies here. These values
z Z
apply to aircraft on parallel routes at the same flight level and at
flight levels separated by 300 m (1000 ft).
Y-Direction. - The method used to determine y-direction
parameters is more complicated than that described for the x and z
directions. In order to determine Py, a distribution often used
to model cross-track pathkeeping in the North Atlantic (NAT), the
double-double exponential (Reference 6), is used. That distribution
is of the form:
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-- a
f(y) _ (i a) exp (-lyl/bI) + 2 (b2) exp (-lyl/b2) (7)2 b1
where a = .0014246
bI = 3.7 km (2 n. mi.)
b2 = 56 km (30 n. ml.)
are parameters that w-Illyield lateral deviation statistics that
correspond to aircraft in compliance with theMinimumNavigatlonal
Performance Specification (MNPS) for the NAT.
As f(y) is the distribution of each aircraft's deviation from
route centerline, P can be found by convolvlng f(y) with route-
Y
spacing + f(y) and integrating over P from y = - L to + L .
Y Y Y
To determine Ly, a blunder scenario Is modeled, with an
aircraft on each route proceeding towards the other route at an
angle of 0.17 tad (i0 deg), representing a waypoint insertion error
of i degree of latitude at typical NAT latitudes. The tau and
tau-dot criteria are used to determine the maximum cross-track
distance at which a CDTI alert can be given. In thls way, L is
Y
determined separately for the same and opposite direction cases.
More details of thls procedure are given in Appendix B.
Taking into account the values assumed by Pz and Nz,
equation (2) simplifies to:
RA = Nx + P N (8)Py x y
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when the aircraft on the adjacent track have differences in assigned
altitudes of 300 m (i000 ft), and RA= 0 when the difference in
assigned altitude is 610 (2000 ft).
When determining the alert rate due to aircraft on the same
track at adjacent altitudes, P = I (the aircraft are always in
Y
overlap in the y direction) and N = 0 (the frequency of entering
Y
into lateral overlap is 0). For 300 m (i000 ft) vertical
separation, equation (8) then further reduces to:
RA = Nx (9)
Stated simply, the CDTI alert rate becomes a measure of the
frequency at which the aircraft pass in thls particular case.
The resultant parameters for various separation minima are shown
in Table 2.
Results
Table 3 shows alert rates for route pairs wlth all combinations
of the following spacings:
lateral separation: ii0 and 56 km (60 and 30 n. ml.)
longitudinal separation: I0 and 5 mln
vertical separation: 610 and 300 m (2000 and i000 ft).
The results show the maximum alert rate as seen by a pilot on
one of a palr of routes wlth the given separation. Results are
presented separately for same and opposite direction tracks, and
separately for horizontal and vertical route pairs (i.e., separately
for traffic on adjacent coaltltude tracks and for traffic on the
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TABLE 2. - VALUES OF ALERT RATE PARAMETERS
Separation ] Route Pair
Minimum I Same Direction [ Opposite DirectionI
Lateral 110km (60n. mi.) 156km (30n. mi.) 110km (60n. ml.) 56 km (30n. mi.)
Ly 18.4 km (9.91 n. mi.) 18.4 km (9.91n. mi.) 29 km (15.8 n. mi.) 29 km (15.8 n. mi.)
iVyl 185.8m/s (167knots)85.8m/s(167knots)107m/s(208knots)107m/s(208knots)
Py 1.30x10-4 4.84xi0-4 2.13x10-4 2.45xi0-3
Ny 1.10x10-3/hr 4.08x10-3/hr 1.40x10-3/hr 1.62x10-2/hr
]Longitudinal i0 mln 5 mln i0 mln 5 mln
V_x 11.4 km (6.17n. mi.) ii.4 km (6.17n. mi.) 74 km (40 n. mi.) 74 km (40 n. mi.)i I 20.6 m/s (40 k ots) 20 6 m/s (40 k ots) 617 /s (1200 knots)J617m/s (1200 knots)
Px 0.0771 0.154 0.4 0.8
Nx 0.5/hr 1.0/hr 12./hr 24./hr
Vertical 610 m (2000 ft) 1300m (i000 ft) 610 m (2000 ft) 300 m (i000 ft)
Lz 370 m (1200 ft) 1370m (1200 ft) 370 m (1200 ft) 370 m (1200 ft)
Pz 0 I 1 0 1
Nz 0 ] 0 0 0I
TABLE3. - ALERTRATEFOR ROUTEPAIRS
i Same-DirectlonRoutes _ Opposite-DirectlonRoutes
Separation IAlertsPer _Hrs.Betw. IFlts.Betw. IAlertsPer IHrs.Betw. IFlts.Betw.
Minima IHour IAlerts IAlerts IHour IAlerts IAlerts
Horizontal*
110 km (60 n. ml.)/10mln 1.50xi0-4 6670 1670 0.00312 321 80.1
Ii0 km (60 n. ml.)/5 min 2.99xi0-4 3340 836 0.00624 160 40.1
56 km (30 n. ml.)/10min 5.57xi0-4 1800 449 0.0359 27.9 6.96
56 km (30n.mi.)/5 mln l.llxl0-3 901 225 0.0717 13.9 3.49
Vertical**
i0 min/300m (i000ft) 0.5 2.0 0.50 12.0 0.0833 0.0208
5 mln/300m (1000ft) 1.0 1.0 0.25 24.0 0.0417 0.0104
* Vertical separation of adjacent tracks = 0 or 300 m (i000 ft).
** Horizontal separation of adjacent flight level tracks = 0 m.
Routes separated vertically by 610 m (2000 ft) or more experience zero alert rate.
-4
same track but at different flight levels). Alerts per hour and the
number of hours between alerts are shown, as well as the number of
flights between alerts, assuming four hours of flight time in the
track system. For example, for a pair of routes spaced ii0 km
(60 n. mi.) apart with i0 min longitudinal separation, a CDTI alert
would occur at most once every 1670 flights for same-direction
traffic, and every 80 flights for opposlte-dlrectlon traffic. For
vertical route pairs, the alert rate at 610 m (2000 ft) vertical
separation is zero, while at 300 m (i000 ft) spacing the maximum
alert rate is equal to the rate of passing of the aircraft. As a
result, the alert rate for this vertical route pair is more than an
order of magnitude greater than the alert rate for a horizontal
route pair for any given flow rate.
Given the data in Table 3, a composite alert rate can be
computed for an aircraft in any desired scenario for various
combinations of separation minima. In Table 4 the alert rates for
vertical and horizontal route pairs are summed to give a composite
alert rate for both a "same-direction" scenario and an
"opposite-dlrection" scenario. Both scenarios assume that the
subject aircraft is surrounded on all sides by aircraft on adjacent
tracks and flight levels. The same-directlon scenario assumes that
all aircraft are moving in the same direction. The
opposite-direction scenario assumes that traffic on one of the
adjacent tracks is moving in the opposite direction from the subject
aircraft. For example, for an aircraft in the same-dlrectlon
scenario with 60/10/2000 separation minima, the total alert rate
would be twice the value of the 60/10 horizontal route pair shown in
Table 3, since no alerts for vertical route pairs would be
detected. However, for the 60/10/1000 case, the total alert rate is
the sum of twice the vertical i0/i000 rate (for the flight levels
just above and below the subject flight level) plus six times the
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TABLE4. - ALERTRATE FOR AIRCRAFTIN TRACKSYSTEM
Same-Dlrectlon Scenario I 0pposite-Direction Scenario
Alerts Hours IFllghts IAlerts IHours IFlights
Separation Per Between lBetween IPer IBetween Between
Minima Hour Alerts IAlerts IHour IAlerts Alerts
I I I
60/10/2000 3.00x10-4 3330 I 833 I 0.00624I 160 40.1
60/5/2000" 5.98xi0-4 1670 l 418 l 0.0125 I 80.0 20.0
30/10/2000" l.llxi0-3 901 I 225 I 0.0717 I 13.9 3.49
30/5/2000" 2.22xi0-3 450 I 113 I 0.143 I 6.99 1.75
I I I
I I I
60/10/1000" 1.00 1.00 I 0.250 I 1.01 I 0.990 0.248
60/5/1000 2.00 0.500 l 0.125 I 2.02 I 0.495 0.124
30/10/1000 1.00 1.00 I 0.250 I i.ii I 0.901 0.225
30/5/1000 2.01 0.498 I 0.124 i 2.22 I 0.450 0.113
I I I
* Principal candidate for reduced separation
-4
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horizontal 60/10 rate (since the traffic on adjacent tracks at
altitudes 300 m (i000 ft) above and below the subject flight level
will also be included).
This same-dlrectlon case is representative of a worst-case
scenario for the North Atlantic; that is, almost all of the NAT
traffic will be one-way, but the loading rates will rarely be as
high on all tracks surrounding an aircraft as are specified (i.e., 6
or 12 alrcraft/hour at i0 or 5 minute spacing). At 610 m (2000 ft)
vertical separation, even the smallest separation minima in the
other two dimensions will only result in one alert every 113
flights. With 300 m (i000 ft) vertical separation, the number of
alerts caused by traffic at adjacent flight levels on the same track
dominates the alerts caused by traffic on adjacent tracks.
In the opposite-directlon scenario, it has been assumed that
opposlte-dlrectlon alerts will only occur in the horizontal
dimension, and only from one side. In the case of 300 m (i000 ft)
vertical spacing, the vertical alerts (i.e., alerts caused by
traffic above and below the subject aircraft, and proceeding in the
same direction) will dominate the horizontal alerts (i.e., alerts
caused by traffic on adjacent routes), in a similar fashion to the
same-dlrectlon case.
In general, then, there will be few alerts from traffic on
adjacent routes traveling in the same direction: one every 113
flights is predicted at the closest separations considered. Even
opposite-dlrectlon traffic at 56 km (30 n. ml.) lateral separation
and 5 minute headways would only result in an alert approxlmately
every other flight. If 300 m (i000 ft) vertical separation is used,
every aircraft passing on the same track will cause an alert. For
60/10/1000 separation minima, both the same-dlrectlon scenario and
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the opposite-direction scenario result in a maximum of approximately
one alert per hour.
For the four principal schemes for reducing separation, the
following estimates, from Table 4, should represent upper bounds on
the CDTI alert rate:
Reduced Vertical Spacing
with One-Way Tracks - 4 Alerts per Flight
Reduced Lateral and
Reduced Longitudinal Spacing - 1.7 Flights per Alert
Reduced Lateral Spacing - 3.5 Flights per Alert
Reduced Longitudinal Spacing - 20 Flights perAlert
Peak Vs. Average Alert Rates
The maximum alert rates estimated here represent peak conditions
which may be approached under heavy route loading in a localized
area of the track system. Under normal route loading, however, the
average CDTI alert rates should be substantially less than the
maximum values. Although detailed route loading data is not
available, some inferences can be made based on the occurrence of
various conditions in the North Atlantic.
The effect of the mainly unidirectional traffic flow in the NAT
is that there are very few opposlte-directlon route pairs (some
days, during one of the major flows, there may be no tracks at all
in the opposite direction). It is unlikely that efficient routes in
opposite directions would be situated near each other, even when
there is a minor flow in the opposite direction. Even if
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same-dlrectlonroute spacingwere to be narrowed to 56 km
(30 n. mi.) there shouldbe little need for such close spacingfor
opposlte-dlrectlonroutes. The same is even more true for the need
for opposite-directiontrafficat alternatealtitudes,particularly
at 300 m (i000 ft) intervals.
Another characteristic of actual system operations is that, in
general, minimum longitudinal separation will be applied only during
higher density operations, and then only for short periods of
time. For example, if the allowable spacing is 5 minutes, but
there is a 15 minute gap at one point, the efficient cruise speeds
are in such a narrow range that it is unlikely that the extra i0
minute gap will be eliminated by the time of exit. In fact, a
single route pair, fully loaded with aircraft at i0 minute
longitudinal spacing, could carry all of the traffic of the July
1979 sample day described in the OASIS report (Reference 7). Except
for brief periods during the day, then, the maximum entry rate will
not actually be attained. The OASIS simulation predicted that with
a i0 minute minimum headway standard, less than 15 percent of the
eastbound clearances (i0 percent westbound) would actually use the
minimum spacing and that 40 percent of the eastbound clearances (50
percent westbound) would have greater than 30 minute headways. Even
when 5 minute headways were simulated, fewer than 25 percent of the
entries had headways of i0 minutes or less.
For these reasons, it is believed that the maximum alert rates
projected here represent very conservative upper bounds on the CDTI
alert rate that a pilot might normally encounter.
Alerts Caused by Loss of Longitudinal Separation
The preceding analysis of alert rates did not consider alerts
caused by the loss of longitudinal separation between aircraft on
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the same track and flight level, since no current data is available
on longitudinal navigational performance in the NAT. The best
available data on longitudinal performance was collected over the
Central East Pacific (CEP) track system in 1973-1974, and is
analyzed in Reference 8. This study showed that for aircraft
equipped with an inertial navigation system, the probability of an
unexpected loss or gain of i0 minutes or more in longitudinal
separation was approximately 0.41%. For a loss or gain of 5 minutes
or more, this figure increased to 7.97%.
This longitudinal performance data is not considered
representative of current aircraft flying in the NAT track system
for the following reasons:
(i) The data is nearly ten years old.
(2) The NAT track system is longer than the CEP system;
however, position reports are presumably required at about
the same intervals (every i0 degrees of longitude).
(3) During the CEP data collection, the average longitudinal
spacing was much greater than the minimum allowed spacing.
None of the aircraft pairs in the study actually got closer
to each other than 9 minutes. For a more heavily loaded
system, oceanic traffic controllers would presumably become
more involved in recommending speed adjustments to ensure
continued safe separation. Such involvement could affect
the probability distribution, especially if separation
minima were reduced.
If longitudinal encounters were factored into the results shown
in Table 4 (based upon the CEP data), the alerts per hour would
increase by roughly 0.001 for I0 minute longitudinal separation and
roughly 0.02 for 5 minute longitudinal separation (both scenarios).
For the NAT track system today, however, these added values are
probably too large.
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SECTION 9
EXPECTED BENEFITS
This section discusses the potential benefits of the oceanic
CDTI concept. The first benefit considered is the expected savings
in user operating costs due to reduced separation. The second
benefit examined is the increased traffic capacity that would be
brought about by reduced separation. These benefits will be
discussed with reference to the ability of the oceanic CDTI system
to maintain or improve current safety levels in spite of reduced
separation.
Savings in Operating Costs
The principal benefit for reduced separation over the ocean lies
in lower flight costs. As previously mentioned, reduced separation
would allow aircraft to fly more fuel-efficient routes and
altitudes. Reduced flight time would also mean lower crew and
maintenance costs. In recent years, much study has gone into
reducing air traffic separation, not only over the ocean, but over
land areas as well. The implementation of a Minimum Navigational
Performance Specification (MNPS) in January 1978 has allowed reduced
separation over the North Atlantic. Special Committee 150 of the
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) is currently
attempting to develop a minimum performance standard for reducing
separation to 300 meters (i000 feet) above an altitude of 8800
meters (29 000 feet). The Soviet Union is also conducting
theoretical studies on the reduction of vertical spacing at high
altitudes. SRI International, under contract to the FAA, recently
investigated reduced separation in the Oceanic Area System
Improvement Study (OASIS). In short, it is widely recognized that
the potential savings due to reduced separation are substantial.
7S
As part of the OASIS study, a sophisticated flight cost model
was used to estimate user costs for various sets of separation
minima for the North Atlantic (NAT) and for the Central East Pacific
(CEP) track systems for future years. The model included projected
future traffic increases. Costs were measured in discounted 1979
U.S. dollars, assuming an annual user discount rate of 12%. Fuel
costs were assumed to increase at an annual inflation rate of 10%,
while other costs were assumed to rise at 8% per year.
Figure 6 shows plots of dollars saved in flight costs vs. year,
assuming reduced separation minima for all traffic in the NAT track
system. Curves are shown for various sets of reduced separation
minima when compared to the baseline minima of 60/10/2000. The
plots are based upon data taken from the OASIS report (Reference
i). Table 5 compares the total savings for the years 1986-2005 for
each set of reducedseparatlon minima. The OASIS study did not
estimate flight costs for simultaneous reductions in both vertical
and horizontal dimensions; it can be assumed, however, that the
savings for any reductions in this category would be somewhat less
than the sum of the savings for vertical and horizontal reductions
computed separately.
It is evident from Figure 6 and Table 5 that the biggest
potential payoff by far comes from reducing vertical separation.
The next largest saving can be achieved by a reduction in lateral
separation. Reductions in longitudinal spacing result in slightly
lower savings than for lateral reductions. Results for the CEP were
similar to these results for the NAT, but with proportionately lower
figures.
The savings indicated in Figure 6 and Table 5 do not account for
capital cost increases associated with advanced avionics. The OASIS
study estimated these costs at 32 million dollars for aircraft
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Figure6.-Savings in flight costs for the North
Atlantic for future years.
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TABLE 5. - TOTAL SAVINGSa FOR THE NORTH
ATLANTIC FOR THE YEARS 1986-2005
(Millions of discounted 1979 U.S. dollars)
Separation Fuel Crew and Total
minima savings maintenance savings
savings
60/5/2000 91.82 6.24 98.06
30/10/2000 112.95 22.72 135.67
30/5/2000 189.34 26.82 216.16
60/10/10005 432.00 5.48 437.48
a Compared to the separation minima 60/10/2000
b
300 m (i000 foot) vertical separation for oceanic areas only
81
separation assurance devices for the North Atlantic fleet, assuming
50% cost allocation. This cost would undoubtedly be somewhat higher
for CDTI equipage.
Capacity Increases
A spacing reduction of one-half in any separation dimension
would result in approximately a twofold increase in traffic
capacity. The actual increase might be less, depending upon the
number of tracks, flight levels, etc., which are actually added.
For instance, in the current NAT track system, four flight levels
are used with 610 meter (2000 foot) spacing. If a one-half
reduction in spacing resulted in the addition of only three new
flight levels, then only a 75% increase in capacity would result.
Reductions in more than one dimension, of course, would result in
multiple increases in traffic capacity. For instance, separation
minima of 30/5/1000 could mean as much as an eightfold increase in
capacity.
Obviously, no track system is operated near its theoretical
capacity. Rather, a system must have adequate capacity to prevent
long entry delays and large diversions from desired entry points.
In this way, adequate capacity contributes to lower flight costs.
The flight cost model for the OASIS study utilized traffic
projections developed by the international Aviation Review Committee
(ARC) for future years. These projections showed about an 80%
increase in traffic for the NAT and approximately a 170% increase
for the CEP by the year 2005.
Capability for Improving Safety
The oceanic CDTI system has potential for maintaining or
increasing current safety levels, even with reduced separation. To
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begin with, TCAS surveillance provides a totally independent check
on navigational performance. No such independent and direct
measurement of aircraft separation exists in oceanic areas today.
Furthermore, in the baseline CDTI system all aircraft would be
CDTl-equipped; this natural redundancy would provide a great deal of
protection against isolated failures of the CDTI system and would
improve safety levels even further.
In order to assess the safety of the CDTI system in a
statistical sense, it would be necessary to compare the increase in
conflicts brought about by reductions in separation with the
decreased probability of a conflict turning into a collision.
Although there is insufficient data for a full analysis of this
sort, the available data on horizontal navigational performance is
adequate to at least provide an idea of how effective the oceanic
CDTI system must be in order to maintain current safety levels.
Consider first the conflicts which might arise as a result of
reduced lateral separation. In Section 8, a probability density
function was used to represent the MNPS for the North Atlantic.
Convolving this distribution function with itself yields a
distribution function for the total lateral error for an aircraft
pair. It is reasonable to assume that the number of potential
collisions due to loss of lateral separation is roughly proportional
to the value of this convolved function at the spacing minimum being
considered. (The term "potential collision" is being used here to
mean any conflict which will result in a collision without an
adequate resolution maneuver.) Although the actual collision risk
cannot be calculated, this function can be used to estimate the
change in collision risk due to a reduction in the minimum
separation. Evaluation of the convolved function indicates that a
reduction in lateral spacing from ii0 km (60 n. mi.) to 56 km
(30 n. mi.) would increase the number of potential collisions by
about a factor of 3.
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Let the probability of a collision be an inverse measure of
safety for a track system. Also, let F be the average failure rate
of the oceanic CDTI system over an extremely long period of time.
That is,
number of actual collisions (i0)F =
number of potential collisions
Restating what was said previously, the failure rate for the CDTI
system must be sufficiently small to offset the increased collision
potential caused by reduced separation. On this basis, it can be
shown that the failure rate F must be less than or equal to the
reciprocal of the factor of increase in potential collisions.
Assume, as a worst case, that all potential collisions are caused by
the loss of lateral separation. Then in order for safety levels to
be maintained with reduced lateral spacing, the oceanic CDTI system
must reduce the probability of a collision by a factor of 3, or have
a failure rate F of less than 33%.
Next, consider the effect of reduced longitudinal spacing. In
the longitudinal dimension, the only available data was collected
for the CEP track system in 1973-1974 and is analyzed in Reference
8. This longitudinal data may not adequately represent longitudinal
performance in today's NAT, for reasons stated in Section 8. It
should serve here, however, for gross approximations. This data,
presented earlier, gave the approximate probability of overtake for
nominal separations of i0 and 5 minutes. Assume that the number of
potential collisions is proportional to the probability of
overtake. The data indicates that a 2:1 reduction in longitudinal
spacing would increase the number of potential collisions caused by
overtake by roughly a factor of 20. Thus, in order for safety
levels to be maintained with reduced longitudinal spacing, the
oceanic CDTI system must reduce the probability of a collision by a
factor of 20, or have a failure rate F of less than 5%.
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For track systems with reduced separation in more than one
dimension, it can be shown that the increase in collision potential
for the system as a whole is equal to or less than the greatest
increase in collision potential for any single dimension. Thus,
the result obtained for longitudinal reductions above applies to
simultaneous spacing reductions in both horizontal dimensions. It
is not known, of course, what the actual failure rate of the oceanic
CDTI system would be. It is not being overly optimistic, however,
to expect that the failure rate would be far less than 5%.
In the case of reduced vertical separation, comparable data for
aircraft heightkeeping performance is not available. A direct cal-
culation of the increase in likelihood of a collision with a halving
of the vertical separation minimum is not possible. Nevertheless,
arguments suggesting that safety would be at least maintained can be
offered.
First, the oceanic CDTI system ensures that the pilots of both
aircraft will be alerted every time there is a passing at 300 m
(i000 ft) separation. The pilots can ensure that their flight
levels are very close to their assigned values so that a 300 m (i000
ft) difference in indicated altitude can be practically guaranteed.
Thus, TCAS can ensure that flight technical error is driven to
nearly zero for the period of passage. Because the current
separation procedures over the ocean are completely open-loop, with
no monitoring of heightkeeping performance and with the pilots not
always being aware of the presence of another aircraft, the 610 m
(2000 ft) separation minimum has had to include a liberal allowance
for flight technical error.
Where the pilot may not always be able to control his altitude
precisely, as for instance in encounters with heavy turbulence, the
pilot can establish a lateral offset using his CDTI display. Both
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pilots can agree to maintain an offset of about 9.3 km (5 n. mi.)
which will provide a margin of safety in the event of a sudden large
altitude excursion. Such an offset from track centerline would
provide a negligible effect on the lateral separations from adjacent
tracks, which are spaced with at least 74 km (60 n. mi.)
separation. The accuracy of the 9.S km (5 n. mi.) separation can be
confirmed by comparing the readings of the TCAS units on both
aircraft.
Next, the TCAS MOPS requires that the altimetry system on an
aircraft carrying minimum TCAS II meet a 285 feet three-slgma error
tolerance at flight level 400. (This figure applies to the error
between the altitude reported by the aircraft's transponder and the
aircraft's actual pressure altitude.) If two aircraft meet this
requirement, and the altimetry errors have a Gaussian distribution,
then the probability that the aircraft have a vertical separation of
less than 150 m (500 ft) when their indicated flight levels show 300
m (i000 ft) separation is 0.0001.
It is realized that large altimetry errors generally occur with
a frequency greater than that indicated by the Gaussian
distribution. This is because large errors generally result from a
specific failure or error in one component of the altimetry system.
However, there are several means available for detecting such large
errors. All of the modern commercial jet aircraft areprovided with
dual static pressure systems. (This means that there are two
completely independent static pressure systems, served by different
static pressure ports.) There is generally a means to observe the
altitude indicated by each of these systems in flight. The pilot
could compare the results from the two systems in flight before
entering the oceanic track system. If the two agree to within a
given tolerance, it is unlikely that a static pressure source
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error exists. If they do not agree, the pilot would be prohibited
from flying in the track system using reduced vertical separation.
The pilots can also perform an in-flight correspondence error
check for each passage at 300 m (i000 ft) separation. They can
exchange the transponder-reported flight levels as observed by their
TCAS units, and they can exchange the flight levels indicated on
their cockpit altimeters. Such a correspondence check could detect
a dangerous situation caused by the fact that one pilot forgot to
reset the altimeter setting to 29.92 when climbing through flight
level 180.
While additional data relative to this subject needs to be
collected and analyzed (such data collection efforts are currently
being conducted in conjunction with the work of RTCA Special
Committee 150), the factors mentioned above suggest that reduced
vertical separation could probably be achieved without a sacrifice
in safety. The role of CDTI in limiting the size of the flight
technical error would be critical in this process.
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SECTION i0
TRANSITIONSTRATEGIES
In this section, the question of how to transition to an
alI-CDTI track system is considered. The basic assumption here is
that over some period of time, more and more aircraft would become
equipped with CDTI and more of the track system would be reserved
for use by CDTl-equipped aircraft. The goals and tradeoffs of such
a transition strategy are first explained. With these in mind, some
specific strategies are then suggested.
Goals and Tradeoffs
The goals for a good transition strategy would include the
following:
(i) Allow gradual equipage; i.e., do not require CDTI equipage
all at once for the entire track system.
(2) Provide immediate positive benefits for the first aircraft
to equip with CDTI.
(3) Do not unduly penalize aircraft which do not equip with
CDTI right away.
The rate of transition to an alI-CDTI track system would have to be
determined by economic constraints. If the oceanic CDTI concept can
be implemented at a per-aircraft cost that can be paid off through
fuel savings in a reasonable time (say five years or less), then the
concept should be attractive and equipage should take place
voluntarily.
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An oceanic track system could be converted to an alI-CDTI system
on either a track-by-track basis or on a fllght-level-by-fllght-
level basis. Since the fuel-efficiency of specified flight levels
depends to a large degree on aircraft type, converting to an
alI-CDTI system on a flight-level basis would not affect all users
of the track system uniformly. Also, step climbs might be ruled out
for unequipped aircraft if CDTl-only flight levels were interspersed
with mlxed-equlpage flight levels. Therefore, it seems more
sensible for an oceanic track system to transition to an alI-CDTI
system on a track-by-track basis.
Possible Strategies
Figure 7 shows three ways in which CDTl-only tracks could be
added to an oceanic track system: namely, in groups of one, two, or
three tracks. A reduced lateral spacing of 56 km (30 n. ml.) track
spacing is assumed for CDTl-only tracks in these examples. The
advantages and disadvantages of each strategy are relatively
straightforward. Obviously, the penalty for non-equipage increases
as the number of CDTI-only tracks in a group increases, since the
average diversion from the optimal point of entry into the system
becomes greater. On the other hand, if lateral spacing is reduced
for CDTI-only tracks, then more economic benefits are realized by
CDTl-equlpped aircraft as the number of CDTl-only tracks in a group
increases. For instance, if each CDTl-only track is flanked by
mlxed-equlpage tracks (Figure 7a), then the total number of tracks
has not increased and immediate positive benefits are achieved by
equipped aircraft only if vertical or longitudinal spacing is
reduced on CDTI-only tracks. If CDTl-only tracks exist in pairs or
in groups of three (Figures 7b and 7c), then immediate benefits can
be realized by equipped aircraft through a greater choice of tracks
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Figure 7.-Track-by-track transition strategies.
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(irrespective of any benefits which may be achieved through vertical
and longitudinal spacing reductions).
Of course, the transition strategies described above assume that
reduced spacing is allowed on CDTl-only tracks, but not on
mixed-equipage tracks. These strategies provide little benefit,
other than increased safety, for an equipped aircraft which is not
frequently able to use CDTI-only tracks. By easing the spacing
restriction slightly, a new alternative can be considered. This
alternative, illustrated in Figure 8, would allow a CDTI-equipped
aircraft on a mixed-equipage track to follow any other aircraft with
reduced longitudinal spacing (5 minutes in the example). This
alternative is worth considering for the following reasons:
(i) An overtake encounter is the easist type of conflict for
the pilot of a CDTI-equipped aircraft to deal with. If an
unequipped aircraft is being overtaken, a slight reduction
in speed should give the pilot of the equipped aircraft
sufficient time to contact air traffic control (ATC) for a
report of status.
(2) Immediate benefits are realized by CDTI-equipped aircraft,
even if no CDTI-only tracks are conveniently available.
(3) The transition to an all-CDTI track system could be more
gradual; CDTI-only tracks would not necessarily have to be
created initially.
It should be noted that the reliability of the transponders on
unequipped aircraft becomes more critical for safety with this
alternative strategy.
The following enhancements would make the alternative transition
strategy even more attractive:
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(i) Require the flight crews of unequipped aircraft operating
in the oceanic track system to also monitor the CDTI
air-to-air voice channel.
(2) Whenever a CDTl-equipped aircraft is following an
unequipped aircraft on the same track and flight level with
reduced longitudinal spacing, have ATC give the call sign
of the unequipped aircraft to the pilot of the equipped
aircraft.
These enhancements could make pilot-negotiated resolution feasible
for all overtake encounters.
As a final remark, it should be noted that no transition
strategy would be ideal for all users of a track system. The choice
of a transition strategy must be based upon maximizing long-term
benefits without over-penalizing individual users of the airspace in
the short term.
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SECTION ii
COMPARISON OF STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING SEPARATION
In Section 5, a number of candidate strategies were proposed for
reducing oceanic separation minima. Use of the oceanic CDTI system
with each of these strategies was analyzed in subsequent sections
from a number of viewpoints. In this section, a comparative
evaluation of the overall merit of each of these candidate schemes
is performed.
Reduced Vertical Spacing
The first candidate strategy called for a one-half reduction in
separation in the vertical dimension only, with only one-way tracks
allowed. For the North Atlantic (NAT), this would mean separation
minima of 60/10/1000. This strategy has the following advantages:
(i) This strategy achieves by far the biggest payoff, in terms
of reduced flight costs, of any of the strategies
considered.
(2) Because of the one-way traffic, this approach may not
require the 74 km (40 n. ml.) range proposed for other
schemes; since opposlte-dlrectlon encounters would happen
no more frequently than today, even a range of 37 km (20 n.
mi.) would provide an improvement in safety compared to
today's system.
(3) The maximum alert rate, as estimated in Section 8, would be
high, but should not represent a burden to the flight crew;
for the NAT, there should be no more than 2 or 3 alerts per
crossing of the ocean. Most of these alert situations
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would merely be routine passings at 300 m (i000 ft)
separation.
(4) Devising transition strategies is easy with this approach.
The total number of tracks would not change, and initially
one CDTl-only track could be assigned. More CDTl-only
tracks could be assigned later, one at a time.
(5) The TCAS II MOPS (Reference 2) specifies minimum altimetry
requirements for all aircraft carrying TCAS II. This means
that vertical navigational performance on CDTl-only tracks
should be better than for the aircraft population as a
whole.
(6) It should be easy for aircraft on adjacent flight levels to
maintain 300 m (i000 ft) of indicated vertical separation,
except during severe turbulence. In this case, however,
pilots can agree to fly at an offset from the track
centerline to ensure 9 km (5 n. mi.) of lateral
separation. This would be easy to do with the CDTI
display. With ii0 km (60 n. mi.) spacing between adjacent
tracks, this would not represent a significant deviation
from the assigned track.
On the other hand, the vertical reduction strategy has the
following disadvantages:
(i) Every vertical passing of two aircraft on adjacent flight
levels would result in a CDTI alert. During the time of
horizontal proximity (which could last for half an hour or
more), continuous monitoring of the CDTI display would be
required.
(2) Because of the lack of data on the altimetry system errors
of today's transoceanic aircraft, and because of the lack
of a suitable failure model for the proposed CDTI system,
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it is impossibleto accuratelydeterminecollisionrisk
with this strategy. Such a determinationwould requirenew
data and more in-depthanalysis.
Reduced Lateral Spacing
The strategy of reducing lateral separation calls for a one-half
reduction only in the minimum spacing between adjacent tracks. For
the NAT, this is equivalent to separation minima of 30/10/2000.
This strategy has the following advantages:
(i) The maximum alert rate, as estimated in Section 8, would be
the lowest for any of the proposed strategies. For the
NAT, it is likely that most crossings of the ocean would
not experience any CDTI alerts.
(2) It should be easy to demonstrate, without a great deal of
analysis, that this strategy significantly reduces
collision risk in comparison with current system operations.
(3) Since vertical spacing is not reduced, the vertical
dimension would be available for resolving many of the
conflicts that occur.
The strategy of reducing lateral separation also has the
following disadvantages:
(i) The potential savings in flight costs are far less than
with a reduction in vertical spacing.
(2) It would be difficult to devise smooth transition
strategies, since CDTl-only tracks would have to be added
in groups of two or three in order to provide cost benefits
to equipped aircraft.
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Reduced Longitudinal Spacing
The strategy of reducing longitudinal separation calls for a
one-half reduction only in the minimum along-track separation
between successive aircraft on the same flight level. For the NAT,
this would mean separation minima of 60/5/2000. This strategy has
the following advantages:
(1) The alert rate would be low, with perhaps only one CDTI
alert occurring for every few crossings of the ocean.
(2) Of all encounter geometries, overtake encounters are the
slowest to develop and among the simplest to deal with.
(S) It should be relatively easy to demonstrate, without a
great deal of analysis, that this strategy significantly
reduces collision risk in comparison with current system
operations.
(4) Devising transition strategies is easy with this approach.
The total number of tracks would not change, and initially
one CDTl-only track could be assigned. More CDTl-only
tracks could be assigned later, one at a time.
(5) Since neither vertical nor lateral spacing is reduced,
pilots would have a great deal of freedom in selecting
resolution strategies for any conflicts which occur.
The strategy of reducing longitudinal separation also has the
following disadvantages:
(i) This strategy results in the lowest payoff, in terms of
reduced flight costs, of any of the alternatives considered.
(2) With reduced longitudinal spacing, speed adjustments would
sometimes be necessary to ensure safe separation; there is
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some potential for a domino effect back along the track
from an aircraft flying more slowly than its filed Mach
number.
(3) If an alert occurs because the trailing aircraft is
overtaking, it may be difficult to achieve a permanent
resolution of the conflict. Such resolution may require
the trailing aircraft to fly at a slower-than-desired Mach
number, thus incurring an additional cost penalty.
(4) It is felt by some observers that using a collision
avoidance device to support a reduction in longitudinal
spacing would require more frequent position reports,
perhaps every 5 degrees of longitude for east-west systems;
if so, this would represent an increase in workload for
both controllers and ground communications staff.
Reduced Lateral and Longitudinal Spacing
This strategy calls for a one-half reduction both in the minimum
track spacing and in the minimum along-track separation between
successive aircraft. For the NAT, this would be equivalent to
separation minima of 30/5/2000. This strategy would have the
following advantages:
(i) With this approach, the potential savings in flight costs
are second only to those estimated for the vertical
reduction strategy, among the alternatives considered.
(2) The alert rate would be low (perhaps only one CDTI alert
for every few crossings of the ocean) and would not
represent a burden to the flight crew.
(3) Devising transition strategies would be easy with this
approach. Initially, one CDTl-only track could be
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assigned. Full cost benefits would not be achieved,
however, until a large number of CDTl-only tracks were
available.
(4) This approach provides a greater increase in traffic
capacity than any of the alternatives studied. This could
be important, depending on the projections of future
traffic growth for a particular track system.
(5) It should be relatively easy to demonstrate, without a
great deal of study, that this strategy significantly
reduces collision risk in comparison with current system
operations.
(6) Since vertical spacing would not be reduced, the vertical
dimension would be available for resolving many of the
conflicts that occur.
This strategy also has the following disadvantages:
(I) The potential savings in flight costs are still far less
than with a reduction in vertical spacing.
(2) With reduced longitudinal spacing, adjustments in Mach
number would sometimes be necessary to ensure safe
separation, resulting in a less fuel-efficient speed for
the overtaking aircraft. As previously explained, there is
/
some potential for a domino effect back along the track.
(3) Reduced longitudinal spacing, as previously explained,
might require more frequent aircraft position reports, with
a resultant increase in workload for controllers.
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Comparisonof Alternatives
Obviously, the choice of one of the proposed strategies for
reducing separation would require a great deal of analysis based
upon the requirements of the particular track system being
considered. The proper choice would be the strategy which provided
the greatest cost benefits, while ensuring minimum safety levels and
adequate capacity for future traffic growth. It is also likely that
other strategies, such as combinations of those proposed here, would
be considered.
Primarilybecauseof the size of the potentialcost benefits,
the schemeinvolvingreducedvertical separationwould be the
preferredstrategyamong the alternativesconsidered. However,
there are more uncertainties(suchas collisionrisk and pilot
workload)associatedwith this strategythan with any of the other
proposedschemes. This strategywould thereforerequirethe
greatestamount of study to confirmits acceptability.
The strategy of reducing both lateral and longitudinal spacing
would be an obvious second choice, both because of the potential
benefits and the relative ease of confirming its feasibility.
Reducing only lateral separation would be the third choice of the
alternatives studied. Reducing only longitudinal separation would
be the least preferred because of its relatively low payoff and the
potential problems associated with maintaining in-trail spacing.
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SECTION 12
IMPLEMENTATIONISSUES
In this sectionwe considera number of implementationissues
which need to be addressedfor the oceanicCDTI concept. These
includecontentionfor the voice channel,oceanicmultipatheffects,
compatibilityof pilot-negotiatedresolutionactionswith TCAS II
resolutionadvisories,the impact of the CDTI systemon pilot
workload,and TCAS interferencelevels.
Contention for the Voice Channel
One possible limitation on the oceanic CDTI system is contention
for the voice channel. This potential limitation is closely related
to the CDTI alert rate and is influenced by the same factors which
affect the alert rate. Without an estimate of the total system
alert rate, contention for the voice channel cannot be determined
precisely. However, enough information is available to estimate an
upper bound on the probability of voice communication being required
simultaneously for a second conflict within the radio range of an
existing conflict.
To derive a formula for this probability, we begin with the
assumption that the fraction of time that each aircraft requires
voice communication is no more than tc x RA, where tc is the
length of the average conversation, and RA is the maximum alert
rate for an aircraft. Given that one pair of aircraft requires
voice communication for a conflict, the probability of a specified
third aircraft requiring voice communication simultaneously for
another conflict is no more than 2tc x RA. If there are a total
of NA aircraft within the radio range of a conflict pair,
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including the two aircraft in conflict, then the upper limit on the
probability of contention for the voice channel is given by:
NA-2
Pc < 1- [1- 2(tc)(RA)] (11)
Since 2 tc x RA is much less than i, this inequality can be
simplified by a binomial expansion to give:
Pc 2(NA- 2)(tc)(RA) (12)
The values of the variables in this formula will now be
approximated for the North Atlantic. First, the value of NAWill
be estimated. According to FAA sources, a VHF radio receiver used
at altitudes above 4600 m (15 000 ft) must have sufficient
sensitivity to receive a 10-Watt ground station at a range of 300 km
(160 n. mi.). The VHF transmitters used on large aircraft generally
operate at power levels of 18-25 Watts. Range is proportional to
the square root of power. Thus, ignoring any differences in the
gains of ground and airborne antennas, the reliable alr-to-air range
of a VHF radio should be between 390 and 460 km (210-250 n. mi.).
Using 460 km (250 n. mi.) as a baseline value, this represents a
coverage area of 673 000 km 2 (196 000 n. mi.2). Assuming that
the average radio conversation takes place at a range of 37 km (20
n. mi.), this means a coverage area of roughly 708 000 km 2 (206
000 n. mi. 2) for the two aircraft combined.
The peak number of aircraft within this coverage area can now be
estimated. To begin with, the North Atlantic track system occupies
an area of approximately i0 000 000 km2 (3 000 000 n. mi.2).
Thus, the VHF coverage area for a conflict in the middle of this
track system would represent approximately 7% of the total area.
102
Reference 1 states that the OASIS flight cost model projected a peak
instantaneous airborne traffic count of 223 aircraft for the entire
North Atlantic for the year 2005. We shall make the conservative
assumption that all of this traffic lles within the track system.
If this traffic were evenly distributed throughout the track system,
then 7% of this number would mean an average of 16 aircraft within
the VHF coverage area of two aircraft in conflict. Multiplying this
number by a factor of 5 to account for uneven distribution, we
arrive at a value of 80 for NA.
In Section 8, maximum alert rates were estimated for
same-direction and opposite-direction scenarios. Let us assume that
the same-direction scenario applies 90% of the time and that the
opposite-direction scenario applies 10% of the time (conservative
for the North Atlantic). For separation minima of 30/5/2000
(reduced separation in both horizontal dimensions), this yields a
maximum alert rate of 0.016 alerts per hour. This value will be
used in equation (12) for RA. A value of 45 seconds, or 0.0125
hours, will be used for tC"
Substitutingthe above values into equation (12) yields a
maximum probability of contention of 3.1% for the North Atlantic in
the year 2005. Since the average alert rate per aircraft should be
much less than the maximum, this result should be very
conservative. It must also be remembered that same-direction
encounters would tend to develop quite slowly. In many such
encounters, it might be possible to wait for the voice channel to be
clear, if necessary. Time would be much more critical for
opposite-direction encounters.
If the vertical separationminimumis reduced,contentionfor
the voice channelis more difficultto estimate. Although the
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maximumalertratewouldbe muchhigher,voicecommunicationshould
not be requiredfor all of suchalerts.
Oceanic Multipath Effects
In theory, TCAS interrogations and replies can reach an airborne
receiver in two ways: a direct signal from the transmitter to the
receiver, and an indirect signal reflected from the earth's
surface. Since the path of the indirect signal is longer, it is
delayed with respect to the direct signal. This can cause
synchronous garble if the two signals overlap.
Over land areas, multipath should not be a serious problem for
TCAS. This is because the reflected signal is typically both
attenuated and scattered by the terrain. In oceanic areas, however,
multipath is potentially a greater problem, as the ocean's surface
forms a more nearly perfect reflector.
Figure 9 illustrates the geometry of the multipath problem. In
this figure, _ and _ are the altitudes of two aircraft. R is
the horizontal separation (range) of the two aircraft. The angle G
is referred to as the grazing angle and is given by:
AI+ A2
G = arctan R (13)
The delay of the reflected signal with respect to the direct signal
is given approximately by:
tD = R (secant (G)-l)/c (14)
where tD is the delay time in seconds and c is the speed of
light.
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Evaluation of these equations for altitudes and ranges which
would be typical for the oceanic CDTI system reveals that the
grazing angle can vary from 0.26 to 1.2 rad (15 - 70 deg) or more
and that the time delay would typically fall in the range of 10 - 50
microseconds. The significance of this time delay can be determined
by a comparison with the length of various transmissions. TCAS
interrogations are transmitted at a data rate of approximately 4
million bits per second. Short interrogations (normal surveillance,
56 bits) are approximately 18 microseconds in length, while long
interrogations (112 bits) are about 32 microseconds in length.
Replies are transmitted at a data rate of only 1 million bits per
second. Short and long replies are approximately 72 and 128
microseconds in length, respectively. It becomes clear, then, that
garble stemming from the overlapping of direct and multipath signals
could be a problem over most of the operating range of the oceanic
CDTI system.
Because of antenna shielding, it is expected that the multipath
problem would be the most severe for a bottom-antenna-to-
bottom-antenna llnk. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that
the short monopole antennas used at these frequencies tend to
produce maximum gain at about 0.35 rad (20 deg) from the
horizontal. This tends to amplify the reflected signal with respect
to the direct signal.
In 1977, M.I.T. Lincoln Laboratory conducted flight tests to
evaluate L-bandmultipath effects. The study report (Reference 9)
largely verifies the above analysis. Some of the findings of the
study were as follows:
(1) Multlpath scattered from smooth surfaces, especially water
surfaces, is a significant form of interference on the
air-to-air channel.
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(2) Data collected over similar surfaces on different days
exhibited striking consistency with regard to each
multipath parameter.
(3) When compared with the direct signal, the echo in every
case was delayed by an amount which agrees with the
geometric formula (equation 14).
(4) The power of multlpath echos varies greatly, with the span
between the 10th and 90th percentiles being 10-15 dB. The
smoother the surface, the less variation.
(5) Over oceanic surfaces, the power and signal distortion
depend on the smoothness of the sea. On calm days, the
surface acts more llke a perfect reflector, with the
greatest power and the least distortion.
(6) The median multipath-to-signal ratio can be as high as 0 dB
over grazing angles ranging from approximately 0.26 to 0.70
radians (15 to 40 degrees) for bottom-to-bottom signals.
Individual reflected signals often exceed the direct signal
power, with about 10% of the multipath echos exceeding the
direct signal by 5 dB or more.
(7) These results are unaffected by altitude to any measurable
degree. _
(8) The use of a top-mounted antenna in the llnk results in
significant reductions (15 dB or more) in received
multipath at high grazing angles (0.17-1.3 radians, or
10-75 degrees). The top-to-top antenna llnk reduces
multipath levels still further for grazing angles above
0.17 radians (i0 degrees).
Figure i0, adapted from Reference 9, shows typical
multipath-to-slgnal ratios over a calm sea for various types of
links. Since TCAS II uses both top and bottom-mounted antennas, it
becomes clear that the oceanic CDTI system would be resistant to
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Figure lO.-Typical multipath-to-signal ratios over a calm sea.
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multipath degradation, since TCAS places primary dependence on
transmissions from the top-mounted antenna. The bottom-mounted
antenna is used chiefly for fill-in during top antenna fades,
especially at close ranges. In the baseline CDTI system, where all
aircraft on CDTl-only tracks are equipped, the presence of diversity
antennas at both ends of the link ensures that multipath effects
would be minimal.
Multipath effects on the measurement of target bearing also need
to be considered. TCAS manufacturers may use any of several methods
of measuring target bearing. With some of these methods, the
measurement accuracy could be degraded if a direct signal and a
multipath signal were to be received at the time of the bearing
measurement. This problem can be avoided, however, by using bearing
measurements taken only on the early pulses in the Mode S or Mode C
reply. Some of the early pulses in the direct signal will always be
received free of multipath for all geometries appropriate to an
oceanic track system.
Compatibility with TCAS II Resolution Advisories
What are the chances of a TCAS resolution advisory being issued
which is incompatible with the pilot-negotiated resolution
maneuvers? Assuming that the pilot-negotiated maneuvers are correct
and timely, the chances are essentially zero. However, what happens
if pilot-selected maneuvers are initiated late and the maneuvers
selected are not the best choice? In order to answer these
questions, an analysis was performed for vertical maneuvers.
For this compatibilityanalysis,the followingassumptionswere
made:
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(i) A conflict occurs involving two head-on, 310 m/s (600 knot)
aircraft in level flight.
(2) Aircraft #i is initially at a higher tracked altitude than
aircraft #2, but the pilots choose for aircraft #i to
descend and for aircraft #2 to climb. (Perhaps this comes
about because the aircraft were transposed in altitude as
discussed in Appendix A.)
(3) Aircraft #i accelerates vertically at 0.25 g to a 2.5 m/s
(500 ft/min) descent rate, while aircraft #2 accelerates at
0.25 g to a 1.3 m/s (250 ft/min) climb rate.
(4) TCAS II issues vertical resolution advisories at 30 seconds
to 1.9 km (i.0 n. mi.), or 33 seconds before closest
approach.
Using these assumptions and the current TCAS II resolution logic,
calculations were made to determine what initial altitude deficit
would be required, as a function of pilot delay, to cause TCAS to
issue vertical resolution advisories which reverse the
pilot-selected maneuvers.
The results of this vertical compatibility analysis can be
expressed by the following equation:
Ad = 125 - 3.81(tD) (15)
This equation gives the altitude deficit Ad, in meters, which must
occur before a pilot delay of tD seconds will result in a TCAS
resolution advisory which reverses the sense of the pilot-selected
maneuvers. For instance, a wrong-sense maneuver begun 50 seconds
before closest approach (10 seconds late) can make up a deficit of
about 87 meters (280 feet) in altitude without TCAS reversing the
sense of the resolution maneuvers.
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In the horizontal plane, there is even less cause for concern
about sense reversal. With a CDTI system based upon Minimum TCAS
II, only vertical resolution advisories can be issued. Thus, if
horizontal resolution is selected by the pilots, no incompatibility
can result.
Impact on Pilot Workload
In the oceanic enroute environment, pilot workload is normally
very light, a condition which is not expected to be greatly affected
by the addition of a CDTI system. Reductions in lateral and/or
longitudinal spacing should result in alert rates that are too low
to significantly affect pilot workload (see Section 8). Reduction
of the vertical separation minimum to 300 meters (I000 feet) on
one-way tracks would have a more noticeable impact on pilot
workload. As pointed out in Section 8, every time own aircraft
passes an intruder on the same one-way track at an adjacent flight
level, a CDTI alert is expected to result with this spacing. Only a
small percentage of such alerts would require resolution maneuvers.
However, the vertical situation would require more constant
monitoring, and this could bring about a measurable increase in
pilot workload during peak traffic conditions. Nevertheless, the
total time required for monitoring and effecting resolution would
still represent a small fraction of the pilot's workload capacity in
normal conditions.
The one factor that would contribute to a significant workload
increase when operating with reduced vertical separation is heavy
turbulence. If a pilot, in overtaking another aircraft which was
300 m (i000 ft) above, were to pass directly underneath, he would
experience a considerable workload because of the heavy turbulence,
as described earlier. It is proposed that the two pilots agree to
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maintain a lateral offset of at least 9 km (5 n. mi.) with the aid
of the CDTI display. This should relieve the pressure of trying to
maintain a precise flight level when flying in heavy turbulence and
should maintain the workload at a manageable level.
TCAS Interference Levels
The TCAS MOPS (Reference 2) requires that the interrogation rate
and/or power of TCAS II be controlled so as to minimize interference
effects. This requirement is principally aimed at preventing
interference with ground-based ATCRBS surveillance. In oceanic
areas the absence of ground-based sensors makes this concern almost
a non-issue. Nevertheless, this issue can be thoroughly laid to
rest with a simple analysis of the MOPS requirements vis-a-vis the
modified TCAS system.
The specific limitations of the TCAS MOPS are given in the form
of three inequalities which must be satisfied by each TCAS system.
One of these inequalities is aimed at preventing TCAS interrogations
from suppressing own aircraft's transponder for too large a portion
of time. This inequality is basically a limit on the total
interrogation rate, and presents no problems in the low-density
oceanic environment. Another inequality is aimed at limiting the
ATCRBS fruit rate caused by TCAS interrogations. This is not a
significant limitation for the oceanic CDTI system, since today's
traffic densities over the ocean are very low and the increase in
traffic levels over the next twenty years should be more than offset
by a gradual transition to Mode S transponders.
The remaining inequality is intended to limit the total
interference effect of all TCAS interrogations in a local area.
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This inequality is the one which must be examined the most closely.
The inequality can be expressed in the form:
i,Pa,,NT(_t_ _ 280 (16)
250 watts
Where I is the number of interrogations issued by own TCAS in one
second, P is the average power per interrogation, and NT is thea
approximate number of TCAS-equipped aircraft within the maximum
surveillance range of own aircraft.
Approximations can be made as to how the variables in this
inequality vary as a function of range. The variable NT would be
proportional to both traffic density and the square of the maxlmumn
range (assuming uniform distribution). The variable I can be
assumed, in the limiting case, to be roughly proportional to NT.
Therefore, I also would be proportional to traffic density and the
square of maximum range. The variable Pa should be proportional
to the maximum range squared. With these assumptions, then,
equation (16) can be reduced to:
D_ _ K2 (17)
whereD is trafficdensity,_ is maximumrange,and K is a
constant.Solvingfor D, we see thattheallowabletrafficdensity
is roughly inversely proportional to the cube of maximum range:
D _ K/_ (18)
We will now apply this finding to the CDTI system. To begin
with, TCAS II is designed to be effective in a traffic density of up
to 0.09 alrcraft/km2 (0.3 alrcraft/ n. mi.2). If the maximum
range of TCAS is doubled for CDTI over the ocean, application of
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equation (18) indicates that the system could operate effectively in
a traffic density as high as 0.011 aircraft/km2 (0.038 aircraft/n.
ml.2) while meeting the interference requirements.
The OASIS report (Reference i) contains traffic projections
which are useful in estimating future traffic densities over the
ocean. Based upon separation minima of 30/5/2000, the OASIS flight
cost model projected, for the year 2005, a peak of 70 aircraft in
proximity over roughly a 15 400 km2 (4500 n. ml.2) portion of
the North Atlantic. This number included aircraft both inside and
outside of the track system. These numbers yield a peak traffic
density of 0.0045 aircraft/km2 (0.016 alrcraft/n, ml.2), easily
meeting the upper limit derived above.
Finally, it should be remembered, as explalned in Section 6,
that it may not be necessary to double the maximum range of TCAS in
order to double its reliable range over the ocean. That is, a
reduced llnk margin might be acceptable in the hlgh-altltude oceanic
environment. This could ease any traffic density limitations even
further. It should also be remembered, as pointed out previously,
that if separation minima are reduced in such a way that the
likelihood of head-on encounters is not increased, then the required
range for TCAS in the oceanic mode might be considerably less than
74 km (40 n. ml.).
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SECTION13
SYSTEMVARIATIONSAND EXTENSIONS
In this section,a number of variationsand extensionsof the
CDTI conceptare considered. First,a variationis describedwhich
would indefinitelyallow both equippedand unequippedaircraftto
use the oceanictrack system. Next, possibleadaptationsare
discussedwhich deal with the problemof non-trackaircraftcrossing
the tracks. Finally,the possibilityof extendingthe system to
permit cruise climb is considered.
Variationto IncludeUnequippedAircraft
A variationof the oceanicCDTI conceptis possibleto allow
both equippedand Unequippedaircraftto use the oceanictrack
system indefinitely. The basic groundrules for this variationare
as follows:
(i) Separation minima are reduced for CDTl-equipped aircraft.
(2) CDTl-equipped aircraft enjoy the minimum restrictions on
the selection of tracks, flight levels, and in-trail
spacing.
(3) Unequipped aircraft are restricted to tracks, flight
levels, and in-trail spacing distances which guarantee that
the separation between pairs of unequipped aircraft is
never reduced.
Both the separation minima and the resolution procedures would be
modified with this variation.
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Figure ii presents an example of separation minima using the
variation described above. In this example, CDTl-only tracks
alternate with mixed-equipage tracks. Separation minima are reduced
for CDTl-equipped aircraft to 56 km (30 n. mi.) laterally and to 5
minutes for in-trail spacing. Unequipped aircraft are restricted to
mixed-equipage tracks and to i0 minutes for in-trail spacing.
With the mixed-equipage variation, air-to-air communication
between equipped and unequipped aircraft might be possible if
unequipped aircraft also monitored the designated CDTI voice
frequency. However, as previously explained, the identification of
unequipped aircraft for establishing communication would be a
problem.
If voice contact were possible between CDTl-equipped aircraft
and unequipped aircraft, then resolution procedures would have to be
only slightly modified. In equipped-unequipped conflicts,
resolution maneuvers would become the primary responsibility of the
pilot of the equipped aircraft. Voice contact would be used
primarily for the pilot of the equipped aircraft to obtain the
heading of the unequipped aircraft and to ensure that the pilot of
the unequipped aircraft was apprised of the situation and did not
make an uncooperative maneuver. It would not be desirable, in
general, for the pilot of the equipped aircraft to recommend a
maneuver for the unequipped aircraft, since the CDTI might not show
all other traffic in the vicinity of the unequipped aircraft.
However, in cases involving deviation from assigned flight level by
the unequipped aircraft, it would be reasonable for the pilot of the
equipped aircraft to suggest a return to assigned flight level for
the unequipped aircraft. The pilot of the unequipped aircraft could
confirm the reasonableness of this maneuver on the basis of
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exchanged, assigned and actual flight levels, without the need to
observe a CDTI display.
If voice contact were not possible for equipped-unequipped
conflicts, no guarantee would exist that the unequipped aircraft
would not make an uncooperative maneuver. However, since no time
would be required for a conversation, the pilot of the equipped
aircraft would have more time (perhaps 45 more seconds) to execute a
resolution maneuver. This extra time would in most cases allow
nearly as much separation to be achieved as would be possible if
both aircraft performed cooperative maneuvers. Without voice
contact, the heading of an unequipped intruder would not be known
with extreme accuracy (assuming the CDTI system is based upon
Minimum TCAS II). Thus, the vertical dimension would have to be
relied upon more heavily for resolution. For same-direction
encounters, the oceanic control system often would have to be
contacted for final resolution.
The mixed-equipage variation described above would have the
following advantages:
(i) Reduced spacing would give equipped aircraft a greater
selection of routes and/or reduced waiting time for entry
into the track system.
(2) Unequipped aircraft would not be penalized.
(3) The incidence of conflicts between unequipped aircraft
would not be increased.
(4) The first aircraft to equip with CDTI could obtain
immediate positive benefits.
(5) The system could eventually transition, if desired, to an
alI-CDTI system; a greater variety of transition strategies
would be possible.
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However, the mixed-equipage variation would have the following
disadvantages:
(i) Resolution by one aircraft would be less reliable.
(2) Without the natural redundancy of having both conflict
aircraft equipped, the variation would be more susceptible
to equipment failures; this would mean either less system
reliability or a higher cost for CDTI equipment.
(3) In an equipped-unequipped conflict, the data llnk might not
be as reliable, since ATCRBS transponders generally use
only a single, bottom-mounted antenna; thus, the llnk would
be somewhat more susceptible to signal fades and multipath
effects.
For a given set of separation minima, maximum alert rates (at
capacity loading) for this system variation would actually be the
same as those computed for the baseline CDTI system. However,
actual alert rates would depend on the mix of equipped and
unequipped aircraft, as well as their distribution within the track
system.
It is to be expected that the introduction of the oceanic CDT1
concept would initially be accompanied by skepticism and distrust on
the part of some of the persons and organizations involved. The
basic concept, which applies reduced separations only between
equipped aircraft, is able to instill a higher level of confidence
than the mixed-equipage approach described here because of the
equipment redundancy, the cross-checklng possible through the action
of two sets of crews, the ease of establishing voice contact, and
the confirmation possible of each pilot's intentions. Primarily for
this reason, it is recommended that the CDTI concept be implemented
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initially by applying reduced separation minima only between
equipped aircraft. Once experience has been acquired with this type
of operation, the use of reduced separations between equipped and
unequipped aircraft could be considered.
Adaptations for Non-Track Aircraft Crossing the Tracks
The occurrence of non-track aircraft crossing the tracks of
today's oceanic track systems is becoming increasingly common. In
this situation, the non-track aircraft is usually forced to fly
above or below the track system. In order for a non-track aircraft
to actually fly through the track system, air traffic controllers
must create, at the appropriate flight level, a moving "window" in
the stream of traffic on each track whlch is to be crossed. For
typical oceanic control systems, controllers do not have a situation
display, and position reports are received on an infrequent basis
(only about once an hour from each aircraft). Therefore, the
controller's ability to mentally project a non-track aircraft ahead
is limited, and such "windows" must be very large in size. This can
produce delays and can lower traffic capacity on the tracks.
Under the oceanic CDTI concept, if the non-track aircraft is
CDTl-equipped, then the size of the windows on CDTl-only tracks can
be somewhat reduced, resulting in less delay on these tracks. This
is illustrated in Figure 12. The amount of such reductions would
depend on the statistical distribution representing a controller's
ability to accurately project the non-track aircraft across the
tracks.
In general, specific tracks are not permanently established for
crossing aircraft. Consequently, the pilot of an aircraft in the
oceanic track system cannot visualize the intended separation
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geometry merely by knowing the two assigned track identifiers. The
pilots of two aircraft in conflict must devise a resolution strategy
based only on the actual geometry at that moment. Even so, the
pilots should be able to develop acceptable resolutions, and this
capability should permit the "window" for separating a crossing
aircraft from a track aircraft to be reduced when both are equipped.
The reduced separations may not produce as much advantage as at
first expected, however, because only some of the tracks would be
those reserved for CDTl-equipped aircraft. The additional
complexity for the oceanic controllers in determining the clearances
for a CDTI-equipped aircraft's crossing path when some tracks
require one separation and others another may more than offset the
limited benefits. On the other hand, if reduced separations were
permitted between equipped and unequipped aircraft, it would be
convenient and beneficial to apply reduced separations for a
CDTl-equipped crossing aircraft.
The oceanic CDTI system would be much less helpful in the case
of an unequipped aircraft crossing the tracks. In this case, the
size of the windows on CDTI-only tracks probably could not be
reduced significantly if safety were to be maintained. The
resolution of a crossing encounter would be much more difficult for
one pilot than for two. Air-to-air communication between the pilots
might help to some extent, but, as previously explained, proper
radio identification becomes a problem in establishing contact with
an unequipped aircraft.
It seems likely that as CDTI were introduced to a track system,
the strategy for dealing with non-track aircraft crossing the tracks
would evolve with time. Early reports from CDTl-equipped aircraft
on crossing traffic could give a much better idea of what separation
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distances were required. Reductions in the sizes of the track
windows would become much more feasible once confidence in the CDTI
system had been established and a high level of CDTI equipage had
been attained.
Extension to Permit Cruise Climb
The concept of cruise climb simply means that an aircraft is
allowed to perform free-form flight in the vertical dimension. This
would enable a pilot to fly constantly at his aircraft's most
fuel-efficient altitude. For most aircraft, the optimum altitude
increases slightly as fuel is burned off and the aircraft gross
weight decreases. Studies have shown that controllers find it
extremely difficult to project multiple cruise climb trajectories in
three dimensions. Therefore, in order to permit cruise climb, the
altitude spectrum of an oceanic track system would have to be
divided into one or more layers, or ranges of altitudes. Each
altitude clearance would be issued as a range; a pilot could fly at
any altitude within the range and would only need a new clearance if
it became necessary to transition to another altitude layer. With a
system of this sort, heavy reliance would be placed upon the
horizontal dimension for the safe separation of aircraft.
The benefits of cruise climb are significant. The UK delegation
of the international Aviation Review Committee (ARC) estimated the
potential savings in flight costs at 66 million dollars over ii
years (1995-2005) for the North Atlantic fleet (Reference i). This
estimate was based upon the assumption of a slngle-layer system with
15/2 horizontal separation minima.
In order to rely more on the horizontal dimension for aircraft
separation without loss of traffic capacity, it would be necessary
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to reduce lateral and longitudinal separation minima to the greatest
degree possible. Therefore, in order to support the cruise climb
concept, the oceanic CDTI system would have to allow sufficient
reductions in horizontal separation minima both to offset the loss
of vertical flight levels an___dtoprovide sufficient capacity for
reasonable traffic growth.
In the North Atlantic track system, four flight levels with
610 m (2000 it) spacing are currently used. If the oceanic CDTI
system were employed to reduce lateral and longitudinal spacing each
by a factor of two, then a single-layer cruise climb system would
have approximately the same traffic capacity as before. As noted
previously, ARC projections are for about an 80% traffic increase
for the North Atlantic by the year 2005. A vertical expansion of
the North Atlantic track system, enabling a two-layer system, might
therefore be necessary to provide adequate capacity for future
growth. Thus, the potential of an oceanic CDTI system based upon
Minimum TCAS II for supporting the cruise climb concept is
marginal. A CDTI system based upon Enhanced TCAS II, possibly
combined with improvements in lateral navigational performance,
might allow a reduction to 28 km (15 n. mi.) track separation. This
would provide better support for the cruise climb concept, but at
additional capital costs for users.
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SECTION14
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to document a concept for reducing
oceanic separation minima through the use of a TCAS-derived CDTI and
to provide initial understanding about the feasibility of this
concept. The limited depth of the study in many areas is
recognized. On the basis of the study to date, the following
conclusions have been drawn:
(i) The oceanic CDTI concept as described in this document
appears feasible and offers promise of achieving reduced
separation minima in an oceanic track system. The system
has limitations and uncertainties, enumerated below, but
none of these appears to represent an insurmountable hurdle.
(2) Separation minima in an oceanic track system could be
reduced in four principal ways. From the study to date,
they would be preferred in the following order:
- Vertical separationminimumreducedfrom 610 m
(2000ft) to 300 m (i000ft), in conJunctlonwlth
using only one-waytracks.
- lateralseparationminimumreducedfrom 110 km
(60 n. ml.) to 56 km (30 n. mi.) at the same time
that the longitudinalseparationminimumis
reduced from 10 minutes to 5 minutes.
- lateralseparationminlmumreducedfrom 110 km
(60 n. ml.) to 56 km (30 n. mi.).
- Longitudinalseparationminimum reducedfrom 10
minutes to 5 minutes.
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(3) The followingmodificationsto the Minimum TCAS II
equipmentwould be required to supportthis oceanicCDTI
concept:
- IncreasedTCAS transmitterpower and receiver
sensitivityto increasethe maximum surveillance
range. The maximumrange requireddependsupon
how the separationminima are reduced.
- A device for manuallyenteringthe aircraft'sATC
call sign.
- One new set of air-to-airdata link formatsand
protocolsfor read-outof the ATC call sign.
- A switch that permitsthe pilot to select either
the oceanicmode or the normal mode of operation
of his TCAS.
- A test switch which the pilot can activatewhile
airborne to receivea displayof all targets
being trackedby his TCAS unit.
- A new displayscale capableof displayinggreater
ranges than the currentTCAS II system.
- The ability to displaythe ATC call sign with
each target.
(4) The followingmodificationsto the logic of the Minimum
TCAS II would be required:
- Enlarge the range boundaries to provide a CDTI
alert whenever the target can come within 9.3 km
(5 n. mi.) within 105 seconds.
- Set the vertical boundaries to provide an alert
whenever the target is within 370 m (1200 ft) in
altitude or there is closing in altitude such
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that the target can be at own altitude within 45
seconds.
- Enlarge the proximity advisory boundaries.
(5) The oceanic CDTI concept should be implemented in such a
way that reduced separations are applied only between
aircraft which are CDTl-equipped. In this way, there is
redundancy to protect against any human errors or equipment
malfunctions.
(6) The voice coordination achieved through use of a common VHF
frequency is extremely important to the effectiveness of
this concept. It permits the exchange of additional data
which can clarify a situation and assist in selection of
resolution actions, and it permits the pilots to declare
their intentions'
(7) The procedures for responding to a CDTI alert are natural
and intuitive. Specific resolution rules for particular
situations should not be prescribed.
(8) Data does not exist for making sound estimates of typical
CDTI alert rates in an oceanic track system. Estimates
which are thought to represent upper bounds for each of the
four reduced separation alternatives are:
Reduced Vertical Spacing
with One-Way Tracks - 4 Alerts per Flight
Reduced Lateral and
Reduced Longitudinal Spacing - 1.7 Flights per Alert
127
Reduced Lateral Spacing - 3.5 Flights per Alert
Reduced Lateral Spacing - 20 Flights per Alert
(9) Based on data from the OASIS study, the following cost
savings in millions of discounted 1979 U.S. dollars could
be realized in the North Atlantic for the years 1986-2005,
if all aircraft were CDTl-equipped:
Reduced Vertical Spacing
Wlth One-Way Tracks - 437
Reduced Lateral and
Reduced Longitudinal Spacing - 216
Reduced Lateral Spacing - 136
Reduced Longitudinal Spacing - 98
(i0) Radio Frequency interference between TCAS units over the
ocean would not be a problem.
(Ii) Multlpath signals reflected from the ocean's surface do not
appear to represent a problem because the TCAS top antenna
can generally receive a direct signal that is significantly
stronger than the multipath signal.
(12) Contention for the voice channel appears to be no problem.
A single VHF frequency can be used for the entire oceanic
track system.
(13) The pilot workload represented by this CDTI concept is
modest, except possibly for encounters occurring when
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one aircraft is slowly overtaking another in the reduced
vertical separation scenario.
(14) The introduction of reduced separation minima should be
done only by converting whole tracks to CDTl-only use.
That is, reduced separation should not be used on
mlxed-equipage tracks.
(15) The CDTI concept proposed here provides for easy transition
to CDTI equipage. Early aircraft to equip can receive
immediate benefits; the whole oceanic fleet need not be
equipped.
(16) The significant uncertainties of the concept are:
- What maximum surveillance range is achievable at
reasonable cost?
- What will be the actual cost increment for the
CDTI modifications to the TCAS unit?
- What will actual aircraft densities be in oceanic
airspace?
- Is the bearing accuracy attainable with Minimum
TCAS II adequate to support horizontal resolution?
- Can the production TCAS system be built with
enough reliability to support this concept?
- Can altimetry accuracies and controls for
detecting altimetry errors suitable for this
concept be obtained?
- Do pilots have the ability to make sound
judgments in the variety of situations which they
might experience[
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(17) No judgment can be made at this time about whether it is
feasible to reduce separation minima between equipped and
unequipped aircraft. It is recommended that this not be
attempted until operational experience has been gained in
the use of reduced separation between equipped aircraft.
(18) The use of reduced separation minima between an aircraft
crossing the oceanic track system and aircraft flying
within the track system does not appear to be immediately
feasible.
(19) The feasibility of using the proposed CDTI concept to
support cruise climb procedures is doubtful.
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SECTION 15
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
In this section, a number of recommendations are made for
further studies which might be conducted to verify more fully the
feasibility of the oceanic CDTI concept. Included are recommen-
dations for data collection efforts and cockpit simulation
experiments.
Data Collection Efforts
In order to more accurately determine the effectiveness of the
oceanic CDTI system, more accurate data is needed on the
navigational performance of today's transoceanic aircraft in both
the vertical and longitudinal dimensions. The FAA Technical Center
is currently conducting a large data collection effort aimed at
determining the heightkeeping accuracy of aircraft at high
altitudes. This data, when it becomes available, should help
support the analysis of vertical spacing reductions with the CDTI
system. For longitudinal analysis, a data collection effort is
recommended for the North Atlantic track system similar to the one
conducted for the Central East Pacific track system in 1973 - 1974
(Reference 8). Such a study would compare entry and exit times for
pairs of aircraft on the same track and flight level. Such data
could help estimate the probability of overtake for various
longitudinal spacings.
Another data collection effort which might be both convenient
and highly useful would be to install an experimental TCAS system,
modified to support the oceanic CDTI concept, on an aircraft
flying regularly in the North Atlantic track system. Provisions
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would be made to record the surveillance data on any aircraft that
come within range. Such data, if combined with data on own
aircraft's position, could provide useful information on:
(i) the frequency of large lateral navigation errors,
(2) the distribution of vertical flight technical errors over
the ocean,
(3) the distribution of longitudinal spacing (determined by
studying data for adjacent flight levels),
(4) the effects of multipath in actual conditions,
(5) the feasibility of increasing the TCAS surveillance range,
(6) CDTI alert rates to be expected, and
(7) expected costs in a production version of the CDTI
modifications.
Cockpit Simulation Experiments
Perhaps the best available means for further evaluating the
oceanic CDTI concept is cockpit simulation. The simulation of
one-on-one encounters could help to resolve many of the unanswered
questions related to such a system. The following would be
required: two cockpits with flight controls providing inputs to a
common computer flight model, motion simulation capability able to
simulate heavy turbulence, a simulated CDTI display in each cockpit,
and a common voice channel. Instrument flight simulation would be
perfectly adequate, and no visual effects would be necessary.
Simulation experiments could be designed to:
(i) Determine the exact alert time requirements for effective
resolution with routine maneuvers in various geometries.
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(2) Asses the ability of pilots to initiate and conduct the
necessary coordination and to select appropriate resolution
strategies.
(3) Evaluate the adequacy of the TCAS-derived bearing data to
support pilot selection of horizontal resolution maneuvers.
(4) Assess the ability of pilots to accomodate 300 m (i000 ft)
vertical spacing in the presence of heavy turbulence.
(5) Determine the most efficient and understandable phraseology
for air-to-air communication.
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APPENDIX A
PROPOSED PILOT PROCEDURES
FOR SPECIFIC ENCOUNTER GEOMETRIES
In this appendix, detailed pilot procedures are described for
specific encounter geometries. In general, there are four basic
situations that are likely to give rise to a CDTI alert with the
reduced separation schemes considered in this study . They are:
(i) The aircraft are flying in the same direction on the same
track and have been assigned to adjacent flight levels.
One or both aircraft have drifted off the assigned flight
level toward the other aircraft.
(2) The aircraft are flying in opposite directions on adjacent
tracks and have been assigned the same flight level. One
or both aircraft have drifted laterally from the nominal
track centerlines toward the other aircraft.
(3) The aircraft are flying in the same direction on adjacent
tracks and have been assigned the same flight level. One
or both aircraft have drifted laterally from the nominal
track centerlines toward the other aircraft.
(4) The aircraft are flying in the same direction on the same
track at the same flight level. They entered the track
with near-minimum longitudinal separation and the trailing
aircraft has closed on the leading aircraft.
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Of course,compositesituationswhich combinemore than one of
the situationslisted above are also possible. For example,an
aircraftassignedto an adjacenttrack at an adjacentflight level
could deviatelaterallytowardown aircraftand could also drop
below its assignedflight level. Such a situationcould be handled
eitheras a lateral deviationor a verticaldeviation. Becauseno
specialproceduresare requiredfor the compositesituations,they
are not discussedseparately.
For the four well-deflnedsituationslistedabove, the
resolutionactionsto be preferredare those actionswhich will
cause the aircraft to return to their assignedtrack centerlines,
flight levels,and Mach numbers. Where it cannotbe determined
which aircraft is in error (as might be the case for situation
number 2 or number 3 when the navigationsystemsin both aircraft
show the aircraft on centerline),then actions to return to
centerlinewould be taken assuming that both aircraftshare the
navigationerror equally. That is, both aircraftwould be assumed
to have a navigationerror of the same magnitudebut oppositesign.
By exchanginginformationabout assignedtracks,flightlevels,or
Math numbers as appropriate,it is quite easy to visualizethe
desirableresolution. This is true providedthat the navigation
errors are not so great as to cause the aircraftpositionsto be
transposed(the actual flight level of the aircraftwith the higher
assignedflight level is lower than that of the other aircraft;the
aircraftwith the northerlyassignedtrack is actuallyto the south;
or the trailingaircraftis actuallyahead).
The preceding situations come about from normal navigational
variations which are quite normal in kind but may be unusually large
in degree. Other situations can occur due to blunders, equipment
malfunctions, or other effects, possibly in conjunction with
135
aircraft changing flight levels or in-flight emergencies. These
situations can be so varied that specific procedures cannot be
recommended for them. They are, however, treated in a generalized
way after the procedures for the four specific situations are
presented.
Procedures For The Same Direction, Same Track,
Adjacent Flight Levels Situation
If, at the time of the CDTI alert, the target is at fairly close
range (say within 19 km, or 10 n. mi.), has a very low closing rate,
and has less than the minimum vertical separation, the pilot may
suppose that the target aircraft is assigned to fly the same track
in the same direction at the adjacent flight level. If the
situation is not critical, the pilot would attempt to contact the
pilot of the target aircraft on the designated VHF frequency. He
would then determine whether his own aircraft was flying at the
assigned flight level. If not, he would immediately begin to return
to his assignedflightlevel(assumingthatthisincreases the
verticalseparationfromthe target).
He would tell the pilot of the targetaircrafthis intentions
and would ask for the assignedflight level of the targetaircraft.
He would confirmthat the assignedflight levels reflectedthe
allowableminimumvertical separationand that both aircraftwere at
or near those flight levels.
If own alrcraft is at or very near the assignedflight level,
but the target is not near an adjacentflight level, the first step
should be to determinethe assignedflight level for the target. If
this is an adjacent flight level, the pilot of own aircraft should
notify the pilot of the target aircraftthat his flight level is
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observed to be differentthan the assignedvalue. If the other
pilot recognizesthis and agrees to return to the assignedflight
level, own pilot shouldmonitorhis CDTI displayto confirmthat
correctiveaction is being taken. If the other pilot indicatesthat
he is at the assignedaltitude,then the possibilityof
correspondenceerror within one of the aircraftshould be
considered. Altimetersettingsin both cockpitsshould be
rechecked,and the readings from the cockpitaltimetersshouldbe
exchangedby voice. If there is a differencebetweenthe cockpit
altimeterreadingand the flight level being reportedby the
transponderfor one of the aircraft,the pilot of that aircraft
should try to identify the cause of the difference. He might
comparethe indicationsfrom the dual altimetrysystemon his own
aircraft. If there is a correspondenceerror, it may be difficult
to determinethe source of the error and there may be little
confidencein the altimetrysystem for that aircraft. In this
event, the pilots may agree to maintainat least 9 km (5 n. mi.)
lateralseparationwith the aid of their CDTI displays. They might
have to deviatefrom the course centerlinesindicatedby their
navigationsystemsto achievethis, but the requiredlateral
deviationshould not be more than 4 to 6 km (2 or 3 n. mi.), and
this should be of no consequenceto the oceaniccontrolsystem.
Therefore,the controlsystemwould not have to be notified.
The actionsselected by the pilots in responseto the CDTI alert
for the situationbeing discussedhere should ensure that the
separationbetweenaircraft,as indicatedby TCAS, at all times
exceeds9 km (5 n. ml.) lateralor 240 m (800 ft) vertical
separation. In some cases, the higher aircraftmay have drifted
significantlybelow the assignedaltitude. Or it may be that the
higher aircrafthas receiveda higher assignedflight level en route
and is climbingto the higher flight level. In both cases, it is
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possiblethat the higher aircraftwill be limitedin climb
capability. If this is so, the pilot of the lower aircraftmay wish
to descendslightlyin order to achieve the 240 m (800ft) minimum
vertical separation. The pilot shouldnot depart from his assigned
flight level by more than 90 m (300 ft) in this situationunless a
critical situationexists. If he does deviate,he shouldreturn to
his assignedflight level as soon as possible.
Procedures For The Opposite Direction, Adjacent Track,
Same Flight Level Situation
The pilot would suspect this situation if he were to observe the
target converging rapidly, at a long range, and offset noticeably
from the nose. The target would likely be at nearly the same flight
level. Such a situation might arise due to lateral flight technical
error or navigation position error on the part of one or both
aircraft.
The first step in this situation would be to make voice contact
with the target aircraft. Provided that the situation did not
demand immediate action, the pilot would first exchange assigned
track identifiers.
By taking account of the assigned tracks and by observing the
geometry on the CDTI display, the pilot would determine whether or
not the aircraft are in a transposed geometry. The geometry is a
transposed geometry if the target aircraft, on the basis of the TCAS
data, is predicted to pass off the right wing of own aircraft, but
on the basis of assigned track numbers ought to pass off the left
wing. Figure A-I shows an example of one geometry that is
transposed and one that is not. If the geometry is not transposed,
then the pilot would suggest that each aircraft be turned in the
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_ FigureA-1.-Definition of a transposed encounter geometry.
direction to increase the miss distance. In the geometry that is
not transposed in Figure A-l, each aircraft would have to turn right
to increase the miss distance.
If the geometry is very nearly head-on, the pilot would assume
that both aircraft were midway between their two assigned tracks,
and would suggest that each aircraft be turned in the direction that
would take it back towards its assigned track.
If the geometry is transposed, the pilot would suggest that one
aircraft climb and that the other descend. The implication here is
that there exists a significant navigation error. Turning to
increase the existing miss distance would only increase this
navigation error. Turning the aircraft in the direction which
initially reduces the miss distance, even if such turns would
ultimately lead to increased separation, would not be advisable.
Because of the high closing rate and the indications of significant
navigation errors, vertical resolution is considered as more
positive and is preferred in this case.
In the opposite direction, adjacent track situation, the
suggested resolutions do not require determining which aircraft has
deviated from its assigned track, as was suggested in the preceding
sections. This is because a significant contributor to the
navigation error causing the TCAS notification may be measurement
error. The instruments in both cockpits may indicate that the
aircraft are exactly on course, yet the two TCAS units could show
miss distances substantially less than the separation distance
between tracks. When this is the case, it is difficult to determine
which aircraft is in error. Furthermore, in this high closing rate
situation, there is not a great deal of time to do extensive voice
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coordination. Thus, the strategy is to involve both aircraft
equally.
The pilots shouldmaneuver their aircraft so that they will have
at least 19 km (i0 n. ml.) lateral separationor 240 m (800 ft)
vertical separationat their closestapproach.
Procedures For The Same Direction, Adjacent Track,
Same Flight Level Situation
The pilot should be able to recognizethis situationby the fact
that the targetwould be relativelyclose (9-19km, or 5-10 n. ml.
lateralseparation)at the time of the CDTI alert and would have a
very slow closingrate. The targetwould appear in roughlythe
three o'clockor nine o'clockdirectionand would be at nearly the
same flight level. It is possiblethat the pilot would have
observed the targetwell before the CDTI alert occursbecauseit
would have been displayedas a proximatetarget. In this situation,
there would generallynot be a great time pressure,and there would
be time for discussionabout a course of action.
The pilot should first make voice contact with the pilot of the
target aircraft, and they should exchange assigned track
identifiers. If the situation is critical, the pilot should suggest
immediate action to resolve the Situation or at least to stabilize
the situation. The situation could be stabilized by having the
pilots fly headings that diverge by i0 or 20 degrees. This would
provide time to work out a permanent resolution that allows both
aircraft to get back on their assigned tracks. Whether the
encounter was critical or not, in this situation a permanent
resolution must be devised because otherwise the aircraft would be
in close proximity for a very long time. It may require several
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verbal exchanges of data of several types for the pilots to be able
to deduce the cause of the CDTI alert and to determine appropriate
resolution that will put them back on the correct tracks.
The pilots shouldfirst exchangepresentlatitudeand longitude
coordinates. These coordinateswhen visualizedon the chart
depictingthe trackswill tell immediatelyif one of the aircraft
has a significantflight technicalerror. If flight technicalerror
is the source of the problem,a suitableresolutioncan then be
worked out.
If, however, the coordinatesof both aircraftlie close to the
assigned tracks,the range betweenaircraft as measured by both TCAS
units should be compared. If both read the same, then one or both
of the aircrafthave a navigationerror. In this case, the pilot in
each aircraftshould check his primarynavigationsystem againsthis
backup system(s). The pilots shouldverbally exchange the results
of this cross-check. If both navigationsystemsfor one aircraft
agree, but they disagreefor the other aircraft,then the second
aircraft'sprimarynavigationsystem should be suspected,and that
aircraftshould turn so as to return to its true assigned track.
Assuming that that aircraft'ssecondarynavigationsystem indicates
a positionmore consistentwith the observedTCAS range between
aircraft,that aircraft should continueits flightusing the
secondarynavigationsystem.
If the aircraft were in transposed positions at the time of the
CDTI alert, it is still desirable that they resolve the encounter in
a way that puts both aircraft back on their true assigned tracks.
This may require that the aircraft achieve vertical or longitudinal
separation before exchanging lateral positions. They should
maintain at least 9 km (5 n. mi.) horizontal or 240 m (800 ft)
vertical separation throughout this resolution.
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If the other pilot is first to make voice contact, the
procedures are basically the same as just described. In almost all
cases, the target would already be present on the display in own
aircraft, at least as a proximate target. In these cases, own pilot
would be able to confirm and monitor the resolution independently.
If the TCAS on own aircraft does not acquire the target, own pilot
should check his navigation position and agree with the other pilot
to whatever actions seem warranted by the situation.
Procedures For The Same Direction, Same Track,
Same Flight Level Situation
At the time a CDTI alert occurs in this situation, the target
would be approximately five miles ahead of or behind own aircraft
with a very small closing rate. The flight levels would be nearly
the same. It is highly likely that own pilot would have noticed the
presence of the target well in advance of the CDTI alert, because
the target would have been displayed as a proximate target for a
long time prior to the alert.
If the pilot becomes aware of the presence of the target
aircraft in this situation, he should take action without waiting
for a CDTI alert from his TCAS. He should attempt to keep a
longitudinal spacing of at least 19 km (i0 n. mi.) between
aircraft. To do this he should first make voice contact with the
other pilot and exchange assigned and current Mach numbers and
assigned track identifiers with him. If one aircraft has deviated
from its assigned Mach number, it should return to that Mach number
after a longitudinal separation of at least 19 km (i0 n. mi.) has
been achieved.
If both pilots feel they are, and have been, flying at the
assigned Mach number, then the trailing aircraft will have the
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responsibility for adjusting its Mach number so as to maintain at
least 19 km (i0 n. mi.) longitudinal separation. If this results in
an unacceptable cruise speed, then the pilot of the trailing
aircraft may request clearance to a different flight level or a
different track from the oceanic control system. The pilot should
not depart from his assigned flight level or track without clearance
from the oceanic control system.
If own pilot does not have the target on his display at the time
the other pilot initiates voice contact, he should respond to the
questions and recheck his current Mach number against his assigned
Mach number. If the other pilot indicates that his aircraft is the
trailing aircraft, then own pilot needs to take no action other than
checking his Mach number. If, however, own aircraft is the trailing
aircraft and own TCAS has not yet displayed the target, own pilot
should exchange latitude and longitude coordinates with the other
pilot. If these coordinates indicate that own aircraft has closed
to within 28 km (15 n. mi.) of the target, own pilot should
immediately slow to a Maeh number that is at least 0.02 less than
the Mach number of the target. Own pilot should then ask for a new
assigned flight level or track from the oceanic control system.
Procedures For All Other Situations
There are many other situations in which a CDTI alert could be
given. They could come about from a variety of causes such as an
in-flight emergency which forces an aircraft to make an immediate
descent, waypoint insertion errors which lead to large navigation
errors, or navigation errors on the part of an aircraft flying
through the airspace of the oceanic track system on an approved
flight plan that intersects the established tracks. It is not
possible to categorize these types of situations and to provide
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guidance for specific cases. In most of these cases, there has been
a significant departure from the assigned flight path of at least
one of the aircraft. Thus, reference to the assigned tracks, flight
levels or Mach numbers is not likely to provide help in the
resolution of these situations.
At the time a CDTI alert occurs, the pilot should check the CDTI
display and make voice contact with the target. If, after a brief
verbal interchange with the other pilot and a brief analysis of the
CDTI display, the pilot cannot identify the situation as one of the
four listed previously, he should consider the situation as an
abnormal situation. He should disregard the assigned flight path
information and should attempt to generate a resolution only on the
basis of current position and velocity information as derived from
the CDTI display or from conversation with the other pilot.
The pilots should first develop and carry out actions that will
resolve any immediate threat of collision. This should be done
without regard for assigned flight paths. The actions should,
however, account for any additional aircraft in the vicinity. When
the situation is under control, the pilots can then diagnose the
problem and determine how to return to their assigned flight paths.
In selecting the resolution action, the pilot would generally
maneuver to increase the separation at closest approach. For
example, if it appeared that the other aircraft would be at about
the same flight level at closest approach but that the aircraft
would pass right-wing-tip-to-right-wing-tip with about 19-28 km
(10-15 n. mi.) lateral separation, then it would be reasonable for
both pilots to turn left. Likewise, if it appeared that the
aircraft were headed toward each other horizontally but would have
180 m (600 ft) of vertical separation at closest approach, vertical
resolution would be appropriate.
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Pilots should be cautioned against trying to use turn maneuvers
when the correct maneuver is not immediately obvious. Pilots would
not have a great deal of experience at resolving conflicts in the
horizontal dimension. Given the bearing measurement error of the
TCAS unit, especially at great distances where link margins may be
small, it may be difficult to predict what the horizontal situation
at closest approach will be, based on the displayed data.
Furthermore, bearing measurement errors can be influenced by
aircraft structure and can be significantly different at different
bearings. For these reasons, when the best horizontal resolution
maneuver is not immediately obvious vertical resolution is preferred.
If one pilot does not have the other aircraft on his CDTI
display at the time that the other pilot initiates voice contact,
then the resolution should be done with vertical maneuvers. By
exchanging flight level information, the two pilots can agree on a
course of action even if one does not have the target displayed. It
would be very difficult for a pilot to agree to a horizontal
maneuver when he could not see the target on his display.
After one pilot has suggested a resolution, the two pilots
should negotiate, come to a final agreement, and then carry it out.
They can then proceed to diagnose the situation and determine how to
return to their assigned flight paths.
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APPENDIX B
DETERMININGCROSS-TRACKALERTPARAMETERS
To determinethe y-dimensionof the box enclosingthe aircraft
used by the alert rate model, the following scenario has been
developed. A pair of aircrafttraveling on adjacent coaltitude
parallelroutes each head at a blunderangle, Beta, towards the
other route. At a given time the orientationof the pair of
aircraft is as shown in Figure B-I for same-directiontraffic,and
Figure B-2 for opposite-directiontraffic. 0pposlte-dlrectlon
aircraft are assumed to be travelingat 310 m/s (600 knots),while
for same-directiontraffic,an aircraftat 260 m/s (500 knots) is
overtakingan aircrafton the parallelroute travelingat 240 m/s
(460knots). Given any specificorientationof the aircraft,as
representedby Theta, the maximum cross-trackdistanceat whlchan
alert can occur can be computedfrom the TCAS tau criterion:
R - D
Th z (B-l)
VR
With the orientationas shown,
R = y/sln (Theta) (B-2)
while
R = - [V1 cos (Theta-Beta) - V2 cos (Theta+Beta)] (B-3)
for the same-direction case, and
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Figure B-1.-Opposite-direction cross-track scenario.
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Beta = 0.17 tad (i0 deg)
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1 ---_V 2
Figure B-2.-Same-direction cross-track scenario.
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R = - (VI + V2) cos (Theta-Beta) (B-4)
for the opposite-direction case, where V1 and V2 are the
velocities of the two aircraft.
The angle Beta, assumed to be 0.17 rad (i0 degrees), is chosen
to represent the cross-track angle that would result if an error of
one degree latitude were entered into the airborne navigation unit
for the next ten-degree longitude reporting position. It has been
suggested that this would be a likely cause for the occurrence of
large errors (e.g., ii0 km (60 n. mi.)). Such an occurrence is
actually very rare, as procedures have been developed to guard
against waypoint insertion errors. Obviously, the simultaneous
occurrence of two such blunders is even less likely.
Given these parameters, and with D = 9.3 km (5 n. mi.) and
Th = 105 sec, Figures B-3 and B-4 show the resultant maximum
cross-track distance as a function of Theta for same-direction and
opposite-direction aircraft pairs. The worst-case same-direction
encounter occurs when the aircraft are nearly opposite each other,
while the worst-case opposite-direction encounter occurs when the
aircraft are between 0.8 and 1.0 rad (45 and 60 deg) apart. Tau-dot
logic has the effect of decreasing false alerts resulting from
encounters that have large miss distances. That is, the logic will
suppress alerts that equation (B-l) would signal if the actual miss
distance were greater than M in equation (C-17) of Appendix C. This
equation is a bounding equation which includes the effects resulting
from errors in range measurement.
The result of including tau-dot logic in the opposlte-direction
encounter can also be seen in Figure B-4, as the value for M and the
actual miss distance as a function of Theta are also plotted. In
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this case, false alerts resulting from encounters where Theta is
greater than approximately 0.44 tad (25 deg) will be suppressed.
The maximum cross-track distance pertaining to values of Theta less
than 0.44 rad is approximately 28 km (15 n. mi.); i.e. the
y-dimension of the box is reduced by 19 km (i0 n. mi.). This
results in a substantial reduction of false alerts, particularly
when a lateral route separation minimum of 56 km (30 n. mi.) is
considered.
For the same-direction case, the tau-dot logic does not improve
the false alert rate, as the actual miss distance (see Figure B-3)
is less than M for values of Theta between approximately 0.7 tad (40
degrees) and 1.5 tad (85 degrees), which includes the orientation
resulting in maximum cross-distance at which an alert can occur.
However, this distance of approximately 13 km (7 n. ml.) is still
less than the tau-dot-alded opposite-direction case.
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APPENDIX C
EFFECT OF TAU-DOT LOGIC FOR LARGE
HORIZONTAL MISS DISTANCES
In this appendix, a formula will be derived which places an
upper bound on the average horizontal miss distance for which the
tau-dot logic will totally prevent a CDTI alert.
In the Minimum TCAS II system, the time until horizontal closest
approach is estimated by dividing the tracked range by the negative
of the range rate. This quantity is called tau. For a collision
course encounter in which the aircraft are flying linear paths, the
value of tau decreases by exactly one second for each second of
elapsed time. In contrast, for a linear encounter with a large
horizontal miss distance, tau decreases less than one second for
each second of elapsed time. Tau-dot logic takes advantage of this
fact by computing the time rate of change of tau and looking for a
value significantly less than unity. In this way, it is possible to
eliminate some unnecessary alerts.
For two converging aircraft in straight flight, tau can be
expressed as:
Tau = t[l + (M/Vt) 2] (C-l)
where t is the true time to closest approach, M is horizontal miss
distance, and V is the magnitude of the relative velocity vector.
Taking the first derivative with respect to t gives the following
formula for tau-dot:
2 (C-2)
Tau-dot = 1 - (M/Vt)
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Because of uncertainty in the measured value of range, tan-dot must
be treated as a random variable whose mean value is given by
equation (C-2). This means that the tan-dot test can be written as:
Tan-dot = 1 - (M/Vt)2 + e > d (C-3)
where e is the sample error and d is the tau-dot threshold.
For an encounter involving a large miss distance, once the
horizontal criterion for a CDTI alert is satisfied, the tan-dot test
will be made approximately once per second until either the test is
passed (and an alert is declared) or the point of closest approach
is reached without an alert. The horizontal criterion for a CDTI
alert can be expressed as:
D(Tau/t)i/2< Th (C-4)
Tan (modified) = Tan V -
where D is a distance modifier, Th is a modified tan threshold,
and Tan is given by equation (C-I). It can be shown from equations
(C-I) and (C-4) that the maximum value of t during the time that an
alert is possible is given by:
= Th + D/Vmln (C-5)tmax
which occurs when M = 0. Vmin is the minimum expected value for V.
Operationally, the value of tan-dot can be computed by the
formula:
Tan (Previous) - Tan (Current)
Tan-dot = Time between measurements (C-6)
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However, in the version of the tau-dot logic tested for Minimum TCAS
II, the value of tau-dot was smoothed by calculating a weighted
average value for the past five processing cycles, with the most
recently computed value being weighted the most heavily. It can be
shown that the jitter in this smoothed value of tau-dot is
approximately given by the formula:
(2/15)i/2SR (C-7)
Stau-dot =
IVR{x is
where Stau_dot is the standard deviation of error in the
calculated value of tau-dot, SR is the standard deviation of error
in range, and VR is the range rate. The tau-dot Jitter is also a
weak function of the Jitter in range rate, but it is estimated that
the contribution of range rate error is not a flrst-order effect.
We now wish to estimate the expected value of the largest
positive error in the computed value of tau-dot during a straight
encounter. Let this value be ema x. Let P1 be the probability
of the tau-dot error being greater than emax on a single trial.
Then the probability of the maximum error on N trials being greater
than e is given by:max
PN = 1 - (i - P1)N (C-8)
-i
If PI is very small (much less than N ), then a binomial
expansion can be used to give the following approximation:
PN = N(PI) (C-9)
In orderto derivetheexpectedvaluefor emax,we mustlet:
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PN = 50% (C-lO)
Since one test of the tau-dot logic is made each second, the maximum
number of trials N is equal to the maximum value of the time to
closest approach, tmax, in seconds. This was given by equation
(C-5). Thus, equations (C-9) and (C-10) become:
(Th + D/Vmin) PI (C-II)
PN = is = 0.5
Solving for PI'
0.Ss (C-12)
P1=Th+D/Vmln
For opposite-direction encounters using the oceanic CDTI system,
this equation will be evaluated with the following values:
Vmln = 370 m/s (720 knots)
Th = 105 s
D = 9.3 km (5 n. mi.)
Substituting these values into equation (C-12) yields the result:
PI = 0.0039 (C-13)
From data collected by the FAA Technical Center, it has been
determined that the TCAS measurement error for range has
approximately a Gaussian distribution with a standard deviation of
about 12 meters (40 feet). The error in tau-dot can therefore also
be assumed to have a Gaussian distribution. From tables for
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Gaussian distributions, it can be determined that a probability of
0.0039 corresponds to 2.7 standard deviations. Therefore, for CDTI
alerts for opposite-direction encounters,
emax = 2.7 (Stau_dot) (C-14)
The absolute value of range rate can be given by:
[VR[ = V (C-15)[i + (M/Vt)2]I/2
Thus, equations (C-7), (C-14), and (C-15) can be combined to give:
0.97 (SR) (C-16)
emax - V x is [i + (M/Vt)2]1/2
The above expression for emax can be substituted for e in
equation (C-3). It is clear from the result that the largest
expected value of tau-dot occurs when the time to closest approach,
t, is the greatest. This occurs when the horizontal criterion for a
CDTI alert (i.e., equation C-4) is first satisfied. In other words,
the probability of the tau-dot test being passed is the greatest on
its first trial. Thus, equations (C-l), (C-3), (C-4), and (C-16)
can be solved simultaneously to eliminate the variable t and give
the following result for M:
VT h + D(I + Q2)I/2 (C-17)
M e Q . (l/Q)
where Q is given approximately by:
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Q = [i- d + (Vj/V)(2- d)i/2]I/2 (C-18)
Vj has the dimensions of velocity and can be thought of as an
effective Jitter velocity. The value of Vj is given by:
Vj = 0.97(SR)/Is (C-19)
Equation (C-17) defines an upper bound on the average horizontal
miss distance for which the tau-dot logic will totally prevent a
CDTI alert for an opposlte-dlrection encounter. The maximum value
of the variable V should be used in evaluating this equation.
Evaluating the above equations with SR = 12 m (40 ft), V ffi620
m/s (1200 knots), d = 0.96, Th = 105 s, and D = 9.3 km (5 n. mi.)
gives the following results:
Vj = 12 m/s (23 knots)
Q = 0.24
M z 17 km (9.3 n. mi.)
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